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RETHINKING PRIVATE ATTORNEY
INVOLVEMENT THROUGH
A "LOW BONO" LENS
Luz E. Herrera*
Millions ofAmericans are too richfor subsidized legal services but too
poor to afford a private attorney. These nearpoor struggle to navigate
the legal system much in the same way as the poor, but they have fewer
options. The result is that fewer than one in five legal needs of lowincome clients are addressed by a lawyer. The legal profession has an
obligation to address this lack of accessibility to the judicial system.
Legal services leaders should expand their approach to the delivery of
legal services to include affordable models that benefit low- and
moderate-income clients who are ineligiblefor free legal aid. Pro bono
models do not sufficiently address the inadequacy of affordable legal
services by the private bar. Discussion about legal services must shift
from a narrowfocus on free legal services to a more inclusivefocus on
the needs of both the legal consumer and the private legal provider.
This shift from a pro bono to a "low bono" legal services model would
improve access to the judicial system by low- and moderate-income
Americans.

We cannot continue to ignore the millions upon millions of
people ... throughout this nation who are almost poor, who
do not qualify for legal aid,and who, in reality, are without
sufficient funds to hire an attorney.
-Gary G. Bellow, 19681
* Assistant Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. The author would like to
acknowledge the help of research assistants Bertha Alicia Hernandez, Erubey Lopez, Diana
Lopez, and Marc M. Breverman, who helped gather and organize the materials, and the law
students at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their patience and editing. The author is
also grateful to her colleagues, Steve Berenson, Laura Gomez, Ernesto Hernandez, Rebecca Lee,
Leticia Saucedo, and Steve Semerano for their comments on early drafts of this Article. The
author is especially grateful to Jeanne Charn, Robert Cohen, Jose Padilla, Fred Rooney, Sue
Talia, and Richard Zorza, for helping fill in gaps, for their encouragement, and most importantly,
for daring to challenge conventional wisdom.

1. Gary G. Bellow, The Extension of Legal Services to the Poor: New Approaches to the
Bar's Responsibility, in THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 1967 at 115, 116 (Arthur E. Sutherland ed.,

1968). Gary G. Bellow (1935-2000) was a pioneering public service lawyer and leader in legal
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1968, Gary G. Bellow warned that the newly created legal
services program would inevitably create new problems because it
was based on several erroneous assumptions, including the
assumption that "the provision of legal aid service to the poor is
separate from the general problem of the unavailability of legal
service to others in our low-income areas and to much of the rest of
the nation." 2 Bellow cautioned that the failure of the legal services
agenda to include a component of legal services delivery to the nonpoor would prove to be shortsighted.' He believed that the country
would continue to have an access to justice problem until it
recognized that most of the legal problems of the marginalized in
society are symptoms of political and economic inequalities.'
Bellow's caution was not heeded forty years ago, but perhaps now it
is time to reconsider our approach to legal services delivery.
Millions of people in our country who do not qualify for
subsidized civil legal services, but who do not make enough money
to hire an attorney at market rates of $200 to $350 an hour, have few
means of obtaining adequate representation for the myriad of
unavoidable legal problems they routinely encounter.' While we
continue to have a large (and growing) population of poor, there
exists a larger population of near poor who struggle to navigate the
legal system in much the same way as the poor.' The recent financial
clinical education. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF

THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 28-31 (1974). During his time in Washington, D.C., as a

public defender and the deputy director of the United Planning Organization, Bellow advocated to
create a federally funded legal services program for the poor as part of Lyndon Johnson's War on
Poverty. Id.
2. Bellow, supra note 1, at 115-16.
3. Id at 116. Non-poor is used in this Article to describe individuals who are not poor and
is more inclusive than the term near poor, which describes individuals who are in precarious
economic situations that place them at the brink of poverty.
4. See id. at 121 ("We talk of the need for changes in attitudes of the poor, and the potential
for such changes through contact with lawyers and through exposure to fairer treatment. This may
be true. But the changes will not be very lasting, if they are not accompanied by some real
changes in the political and economic position of the poor as well.").
5. Attorney hourly fees vary according to the market in the particular geographic region.
The range of market rates referenced in this Article is supported by research conducted by
students in the author's Access to Justice seminars at Thomas Jefferson School of Law in Fall
2008 and at Chapman University School of Law in Spring 2008. The supporting documentation is
on file with the author.
6. A 2005 report by the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) concluded that only one-fifth of
those who require civil legal services in this country receive them. LEGAL SERVS. CORP.,
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crisis on Wall Street caused by troubles in the housing market has
increased the pool of low- and moderate-income individuals who
require legal assistance on civil matters.'
On January 23, 2009, the Associated Press featured Timothy
Cook, an individual who fell behind on his mortgage payments as a
result of a prolonged illness.' Cook, along with six of his relatives
and friends who shared the house, found himself on the verge of
losing his home in the midst of a cold Minnesota winter.' After being
turned away by local legal aid lawyers who were unable to assist
him, Cook proceeded to the self-help center at the Hennepin County
Courthouse in Minneapolis. o Courthouse personnel provided limited
assistance and suggested that he find an attorney who might be able

DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 18 (2005), http://www.1sc.gov/justicegap.pdf
[hereinafter LEGAL SERVS. CORP., JUSTICE GAP I]. A follow-up report issued by LSC in 2009
confirms and strengthens that finding. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE
GAP INAMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME AMERICANS 27
(2009), http://www.1sc.gov/pdfs/documenting-the-justice-gap-inamerica_2009.pdf [hereinafter
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., JUSTICE GAP II] ("There is now a substantial body of knowledge
demonstrating that only a fraction of the legal problems experienced by low-income individuals is
addressed with the help of an attorney."). Both reports confirm that due to lack of resources, LSC
grantees turn away approximately 50 percent of those who seek and qualify for their services.
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., JUSTICE GAP II at 27; LEGAL SERVS. CORP., JUSTICE GAP I at 18. For more
information about LSC, see infra Part II.B. For a detailed discussion of restrictions on federally
funded programs, see Alan W. Houseman, Restrictions by Funders and the Ethical Practice of
Law, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2187, 2189-90 (1999).
7. This Article focuses exclusively on access to civil legal services. For a discussion about
the availability of counsel for low-income parties, see generally the ABA's report on the status of
legal aid in the United States. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 38 (2004),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defenderlbrokenpromise/fullreport.pdf
("Forty years after Gideon v. Wainwright, indigent defense in the United States remains in a state
of crisis, resulting in a system that lacks fundamental fairness and places poor persons at constant
risk of wrongful conviction.").
8. Steve Karnowski, Poor Economy Hits Courts, Hurts Programs for the Poor,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 23, 2009, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/nla/
2009/01/23/national/al 13216S56.DTL.
9. Id. The housing crisis has greatly harmed moderate-income individuals and low-income
families who pooled their money to buy a piece of the American dream. Although the number of
foreclosure filings only rose 42 percent from 2005 to 2006, the number of homes that were
actually foreclosed on increased dramatically. Center for American Progress, Subprime Mortgage
Foreclosuresby the Numbers, March 26, 2007, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/03/
foreclosures_numbers.html. See also Stephanie Armour, ForeclosuresJump in December After
Months of Declines, USA TODAY (Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://www.usatoday.com/
money/economy/housing/2010-01-13-foreclosures-rise-in-decemberN.htmobref-obinsite
(reporting that foreclosure filings hit their peak in July 2009 and that approximately 2.4 million
homes are expected to be lost through foreclosure, auction, and other means in 2010).
10. Karnowski, supra note 8.
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to help him. " Still hopeful that he would obtain the necessary help,
Cook stated, "Hopefully, maybe, God willing, I'll find an attorney
who will do this pro bono for me."' 2 After exploring all of his
options for legal representation, Cook could not obtain a lawyer in
time to save his home. 13 "If I could have gotten an attorney, they
would have known what to do," he said. "
Timothy Cook typifies many individuals around the country
who cannot find the proper assistance to deal with their civil legal
issues. " While the difficulties low-income individuals have in
obtaining assistance on civil legal matters are well documented, it
took the crash of the subprime lending market and its repercussions
on all sectors of the economy to highlight the vulnerability of
middle-class 1 families and the limits of our existing civil legal
services model. "
11. Id.

12. Id. Pro bono publico (commonly shortened to pro bono) is derived from the Latin phrase
meaning "for the public good." In the United States, pro bono has become associated with the
provision of free legal services. For a discussion of the development of public interest and pro
bono work in a historical context, see generally Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in
the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REv. 97 (2002) and Susan D. Carle, From
Buchanan to Button: Legal Ethics and the NAACP (PartII), 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 281

(2001).
13. Kamowski, supra note 8.
14. Id. Despite the public's antipathy for lawyers and the availability of self-help remedies,
many individuals like Mr. Cook prefer to involve an attorney in order to find solutions to their
legal problems. There are several studies that show that clients fare better when represented by
attorneys. See Clare Pastore, A Right to Civil Counsel: Closer to Reality?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV.

1065, 1072-1074 (2009) (advocating for greater use of research about the impact of attorney
representation as a vehicle for expanding the right to counsel to civil cases); Russell Engler,
Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveals About When
Counsel Is Most Needed, FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (compiling studies showing
less favorable outcomes for self-represented parties).
15. For a longer discussion of legal consumers' needs, see infra Part IV.

16. The Census Bureau does not have an official definition of the "middle class"; it looks at
several measures of distribution of income to divide the country into quintiles of income
distribution. The 2007 U.S. Census figures report that the second quintile started at an annual

household income of $20,300, the third quintile started at an annual household income of
$39,100, and the fourth quintile began at an annual household income of $62,000. U.S CENSUS
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS, BY
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS WITHIN INCOME QUINTILE AND TOP 5 PERCENT IN 2007,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/macro/032008/hhinc/new05_000.htm (last visited Aug. 8,
2009). For purposes of this Article, "moderate-income" and "middle-class" refer to individuals
who belong to the three middle quintiles of our country's economic distribution, which ranged
from approximately $20,300 to S100,000 per year.
17. The "paycheck-to-paycheck" reality for these millions of Americans has been
documented by academics and, most recently, by opponents of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). For an overview of the economic plight of
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Those who frequent our courthouses and who work with lowand moderate-income individuals have no illusion about the large
gap between the rhetoric of justice and the present reality of our legal
system. All over the country, courts are plagued by long dockets,
slashed personnel, scarce resources, and self-represented individuals
who are not literate in the law and represent themselves in complex
legal proceedings or transactions out of necessity.
The last national study commissioned by the American Bar
Association (ABA) in 1994 (the "1994 Legal Needs Study")
indicated that moderate-income individuals in this country have a
number of unmet legal needs similar to those of the poor. " Recent
reports issued by state commissions and committees on access to
justice confirm the plight of low- and moderate-income individuals. 1
In fact, several of the reports suggest that the national study
understates the problem. California's Access to Justice Commission
reports that in the year 2000, approximately 7.5 million Californians
earned below the state's median income but did not qualify for
federally funded civil legal services. 20 The seven most recent state
reports confirm that fewer than one in five legal needs of low-income
middle-class Americans, see generally Elizabeth Warren, The Growing Threat to Middle Class
Families, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 401 (2004), and Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform
Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (2008). See also
Michael J. Heyman & Theodor C. Albert, Bankruptcy Law's Major Changes, ORANGE COUNTY
LAW., July 2005, at 36 (reviewing the new bankruptcy filing requirements of BAPCPA).
18.

See ABA, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS 9-11 (1994),

available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.pdf The 1994
Legal Needs Study defined moderate-income households as those with incomes greater than 125
percent of the poverty threshold but less than $60,000. Id. at 7. It found that in 1992, about half of
such moderate-income households faced one or more situations that could be addressed by the
civil justice system. Id. at 9. Of those instances, approximately 61 percent never made it to the
justice system. Id. at 27. The most common legal needs of those surveyed related to personal
finances, consumer issues, housing, and real property. Id. Poverty guidelines are determined each
year by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The guidelines are income
thresholds updated annually by a cost of living index. For 2009 poverty guidelines, see Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Annual Update of the HHS Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199 (Jan. 23,
2009).
19. State studies that have been undertaken include California (2007), Oregon (2000),
Vermont (2001), New Jersey (2002), Connecticut (2003), Massachusetts (2003), Washington
(2003), Tennessee (2004), Illinois (2005), Montana (2005), Virginia (2007), Utah (2007),
Wisconsin (2007), Nevada (2008), Alabama (2009), Georgia (2009), and New Jersey (2009).
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., JUSTICE GAP II, supra note 6, at 13, 17; Alan W. Houseman, The Future of
Civil Legal Aid: A National Perspective, 10 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 35, 44 (2007); and CAL.
COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, ACTION PLAN FOR JUSTICE 2 (April 2007), available at

http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/reports/2007_Summary
20.

Action-Plan-Justice.pdf.

CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, ACTION PLAN FOR JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 2.
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clients are addressed by a lawyer. 2 1 With unemployment figures
rising and wages dropping, the number of individuals who meet the
poverty guidelines and make less than the median income has
increased. 22
If the accessibility of the legal system remains the top priority
for ensuring justice, then perhaps we must consider forging new
alliances, healing the political wounds of previous generations, and
expanding the discourse of access to justice to include the provision
of affordable legal services by the private bar that would benefit a
larger client community. If teachers, firemen, social workers, and
government employees cannot afford to hire an attorney to protect
their parental, economic, or civil rights, the legal profession has a
problem that it is obligated to address under the profession's norms
of conduct. 23 This Article urges legal services leaders to expand their
approach to legal services delivery to include affordable legal
services models that benefit low- and moderate-income clients
ineligible for free legal aid. The paradigm shift to an affordable civil
legal services model must be accompanied by deliberate efforts to
integrate the Main Street lawyers who have historically made up the
largest sector of the private bar. 24 A more expansive legal services

21. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., JUSTICE GAP II, supra note 6, at 13.
22. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LOCAL AREA
UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/outside.jsp?survey=1a (toggle "View
State(s) by area type"; select "A Statewide" in box 1; select "06 California" in box 2; and click
"Get Data") (last visited Sept. 7, 2009) (showing an increase in unemployment rate from 5.3
percent in June 2007 to 12.2 percent in August 2009).
23. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct state in part: "As a public citizen, a
lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of
justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT pmbl. para. 6 (2002).
24. This Article uses the phrase "Main Street lawyers" to describe solo and small-firm
practitioners for whom low- and moderate-income clients represent a sizeable part of their
practices. There are no current figures that indicate how many solo and small-firm practitioners
represent such populations; however, previous studies indicate that a large sector of these lawyers
have such client bases. See generallyJEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF
INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO 17-18 (1962) (reporting that "the practice of most
metropolitan individual practitioners" is composed of "the undesirable cases, the dirty work,
those areas of practice that have associated with them an aura of influencing and fixing and that
involve arrangements with clients"); JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO
LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319-33 (1982) (positing that the legal
profession is separated into two hemispheres, one consisting of lawyers who serve large,
corporate clients, and the other composed of individual lawyers serving individual clients, and
that these two hemispheres are defined somewhat by the wealth of the client); CARROLL SERON,
THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW 129-36 (1996) (providing an overview of New York
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platform that includes a discussion about the affordability of legal
services is long overdue and immediately needed to develop public
awareness and political support for accessible legal services.25 This
Article attempts to shift the lens of the legal services discussion from
a narrow focus on free legal services to one that is more inclusive
and responsive to the needs of both the legal consumer and the major
private providers of legal services in this country-the Main Street
lawyers.
Part II of this Article examines the role of the private bar in the
development of the national civil legal services program for the
indigent in the United States. This section is divided into three
subsections, each of which sets forth assumptions about who is
"deserving" of legal services and who is "competent" to provide
them. Part II.A focuses on the historical role and limitations of the
Main Street lawyers' charitable efforts in delivering legal services to
the indigent through early models of legal aid societies. This period
of history, where there was no federal hub for legal services to the
poor, is referred to herein as the "Charitable Era." Part II.B takes us
from the Charitable Era to the debate surrounding the inclusion of a
Judicare component in our present federal legal services program.26
It explains the fears and biases against the Main Street lawyers' role
in providing legal services to the indigent that informed the
development of today's legal services program in the United States.
attorneys' thoughts on voluntary pro bono work versus paid work that turns into pro bono cases
because clients fail to pay for legal services).
25. See generally JEANNE CHARN & RICHARD ZORZA, THE BELLOW-SACKS ACCESS TO
CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES PROJECT, CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR ALL AMERICANS (2005),

http://www.garybellow.org/Text.pdf (advocating for full access to a legal services system that
includes the middle class, offers a continuum of services from brief advice to full representation,
and provides a measure of quality and accountability); William C. Vickrey, Joseph L. Dunn & J.
Clark Kelso, Access to Justice:A Broader Perspective,42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1147 (2009).

26. The model of government subsidies to pay the private bar to serve low-income
individuals is commonly known as "Judicare." Judicare is similar to Medicare-a model wherein
the government compensates private practitioners to provide services-and is a system adopted
by a majority of developed countries around the world. See Robert J. Rhudy, Comparing Legal
Services to the Poor in the United States with Other Western Countries: Some Preliminary
Lessons, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 223, 241 (1994) ("The primary delivery system in

other countries or provinces reviewed is a Judicare system of private attorneys compensated at a
reduced fee by a public agency or bar association administering public funds. Between 25 to 50
percent of the private bar is involved in providing such services in these countries."). See
generally Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice: ComparingAccess to Justice in the United
States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S83 (2001) (comparing the

U.S. approach to and level of funding for civil legal aid services to those of other democratic
nations with similar constitutional equal justice mandates).
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Part II.C explores the establishment of pro bono programs as the
primary form of private attorney involvement that arose from the
Judicare debate and a federal government requirement that recipients
of federal grants use a portion of their federal grants to develop
private bar participation.2 7 This section argues that while a federal
government role is pivotal in coordinating access to legal services
across state lines, the current framework is handicapped not only by
its restrictions and funding levels, but also by the implementation of
pro bono as the primary private attorney involvement program. Part
III sets forth the argument for why emphasis on pro bono models
alone represents an obstacle to increasing the availability of
affordable legal services by the private bar. It argues for the inclusion
of the Main Street lawyers as the principle private attorney providers
in a re-envisioned national legal services framework. Finally, Part IV
offers a "low bono" agenda for alternative private attorney
involvement that takes into account client preferences, the financial
needs of the private bar, and existing civil legal services delivery
models. The Article concludes by setting forth suggestions for
additional research necessary to move such an agenda forward.

II. A SUMMARY

OF THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE

ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT IN DELIVERING

LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO THE INDIGENT
Educating ourselves about the history of private attorney
involvement in delivering legal assistance to the less fortunate is
critical to forming a new legal services model. There are a handful of
legal aid leaders and scholars who have spent their lives advocating
for legal services to the poor, but the larger community of current
and future attorneys, policymakers, and bar leaders have little or no
understanding of the making of our civil legal services delivery
system.2 8 Also, much of the existing literature disregards the
contributions of local bar associations and Main Street lawyers in
providing affordable legal services. Creating a stronger model for
27. 45 C.F.R. § 1614 (2008).
28. Given the lack of discourse of legal services in state and national elections, this lack of
understanding is reflected in the general public, particularly that segment which is under the age
of forty and was not privy to political debates over legal aid between 1964 and 1994. Deborah
Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 869, 869 (2009) ("A

striking aspect of recent American political campaigns is the almost complete silence surrounding
access to justice.").
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tomorrow requires us to understand the motivations and prejudices
that influenced where we are today.
A. The CharitableEra: 1919-1965
Neither the problem of access to civil legal services in the
United States nor the role of the Main Street lawyers in providing
those legal services is new. As early as the 1880s, attorneys pooled
their skills and resources to create legal aid societies, which provided
legal assistance to those in need.29 Until New Deal legislation
introduced federal subsidy programs, such as unemployment benefits
and aid to dependent children, it was incumbent on private attorneys
to respond to legal crises in communities.30
While the origin of legal services for the poor is often traced
back to the German Society of the City of New York in 1876, " most
legal aid advocates trace the origins of their movement to Reginald
Heber Smith.32 In 1919, with funding from the Carnegie Foundation,
he published Justice and the Poor, which documented the problems
the poor confronted when attempting to navigate the legal system."
At the time, poor people "relied largely upon the charitable impulses
of [members of the bar] to supply service to those who could not pay
the going rate." 34 Smith documented that, in 1917, there were only
41 legal aid organizations in 41 cities, which employed a total of 62
full-time and 113 part-time attorneys and handled a total of 117,201
cases. 3 The critique of the legal profession contained in Smith's
book caused an uproar in the legal profession; however, Smith's
29. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 4-5; JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, THE LANCE OF
JUSTICE: A SEMI-CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY 1876-1926, at 16-18
(1928).
30. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 5-9; see also MARJORIE GIRTH, POOR PEOPLE'S
LAWYERS 3 (1976) ("Until the mid-1960s the legal profession relied largely upon the charitable
impulses of its members to supply service to those who could not pay the going rate.").
31. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 4.
32. For a comprehensive history of the legal aid movement in the United States, see
generally JOHN S. BRADWAY & REGINALD HEBER SMITH, GROWTH OF LEGAL AID WORK IN THE
UNITED STATES (1936); EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951);
GIRTH, supra note 30; JOHNSON, supra note 1; and REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE
POOR (1919).
33. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 5. When Reginald Heber Smith graduated from Harvard Law
School at age twenty-five, his first job was to lead the newly created Boston Legal Aid Society
(BLAS). He was one of two attorneys at BLAS. Id.
34. GIRTH, supra note 30, at 3.
35. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 6 (citing SMITH, supra note 32, at 147, 152, 192).
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passion for making legal services for the indigent accessible had
enough support that, in 1921, the ABA formed the Standing
Committee on Legal Aid and named Smith its chairman.3' Although
Smith's leadership brought about additional efforts to address the
legal problems of the poor, the Great Depression considerably
slowed down the efforts of charitable attorneys who volunteered time
and donated money to establish legal aid societies for the poor."
Having suffered their own economic difficulties, lawyers became
less interested in establishing private projects to aid the indigent.
Ultimately, it was McCarthyist rhetoric and the enactment of the
Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949" in England that provided the
U.S. legal profession the necessary fuel to expand legal aid
societies. 3 9 The British enactment of a government-funded legal
system, which subsidized legal services for those who could not
afford them, threatened socialization of the legal profession. 40 In
1950, the General Assembly of the ABA reacted to this threat by
passing a resolution condemning federal government intervention in
legal services delivery and emphasizing the importance of keeping
legal aid private.4 1 In order to curtail the need for government
intervention, the private bar mobilized to operate private legal aid
offices. By the time the federal government revisited the idea of a
government-subsidized legal services program in the early 1960s,
there were over 150 organizations in every major city in the United
States with an aggregate budget of $4.5 million and staff of 400 fulltime lawyers. 42 These organizations were generally established by
Main Street lawyers, and they generally lacked the capacity and the
network to coordinate legal strategies that would help advance the

36. Id. at 7. The Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants (SCLAID)
continues its work today. See American Bar Association Standing Committee on Legal Aid and
Indigent Defendants Home Page, http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/ (last visited Aug.
24, 2009).
37. JOHNSON, supra note 1,at 8.
38. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51 (Eng.).
39. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 17-18.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 19.

42. Houseman, supra note 19, at 36.
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legal positions of the poor on a grand scale. The organizations were
diverse in their structures and largely underfunded.4 3
When President Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty plan
provided an opportunity to create a federally funded system for civil
legal services, there was widespread support among the lawyers
working at the legal aid societies to increase and strengthen their
existing structures." The Office of Economic Opportunity's (OEO)4 5
vision of the legal services program was not informed by Main Street
and private legal aid lawyers. Instead, it was largely modeled after
pilot projects funded by the Ford Foundation in the early 1960s,
which were components of multi-service social agencies that worked
with the poor in the cities of New Haven, New York, Boston, and
Washington, D.C. 46 Academics, foundation executives, and young
attorneys developed the blueprint for a social reform component to
the first federal legal aid program.47 With few exceptions, most of
the social reformers who were instrumental in developing a national
legal services program were disconnected from the existing legal aid
movement supported by the private bar. 4
The key to enacting federal legislation was to merge the two
movements-the one supported by the private bar and the one
envisioned by social reformers-into a consolidated proposal for a
national legal services program. The effort to reconcile the two
strategies was a difficult political batt- which the leadership of the
ABA and government officials ultir
ty settled without input from
the existing legal aid lawyers or I
Street lawyers.
43.
EQUAL
STATES
44.
45.

ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, CTR. FOR LAW AND SOC. POLICY, SECURING
JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED
3 (2007), http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0158.pdf.
See id. at 7.
The OEO was established by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-

452, 78 Stat. 508 (1964) (repealed in part 1981).
46. The projects funded were Mobilization for Youth in New York; Action for Boston
Community Development; the Legal Assistance Association in New Haven, Connecticut; and the
United Planning Organization in Washington D.C. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 4-5.
See generally JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 21-32 (providing an overview of the creation of

"neighborhood lawyer programs" such as those mentioned above).
47. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 21-35 (describing the neighborhood lawyer experiments
funded by Ford Foundation executives and implemented by university professors and young
lawyers).
48. Id. at 35.
49. The idea for the national program is traced to Jean and Edgar Cahn, who, in 1964,
published a piece in the Yale Law Journal advocating for neighborhood law offices that could
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In 1964, the ABA leadership learned of the social reformers'
ambitions and reminded the group that the ABA could be either
friend or foe in the OEO's legal services effort." ABA support for
the OEO program was forged by individuals who had little or no
experience working directly with existing legal aid programs." They
understood, however, that the ABA needed to control negotiations
surrounding the OEO program lest the program permit the possibility
of non-lawyers practicing law." In 1965, the ABA House of
Delegates unanimously sanctioned the idea of creating the OEO's
Legal Services Program (LSP). The ABA endorsement came after
the ABA obtained assurances that it would participate on a
permanent advisory committee to guide OEO policy." ABA support
was orchestrated by then ABA president Lewis Powell, who had
made access to counsel one of his priorities for the ABA during his
term. " Powell and his advisors lobbied a broad base of ABA leaders
to support the OEO initiative and used the 1965 ABA annual
provide a voice for the poor. See Edgar S. & Jean Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian
Perspective,73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964). While still working on the piece, Jean Cahn worked at
the U.S. Department of State, and Edgar Cahn worked at the U.S. Department of Justice in
Washington, D.C. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 40-43 (describing the fears of social reformers that
local bar organizations would "water[] down the legal services organizations with conservative
lawyers" who would be unwilling to undertake legal action to ensure legal rights for the poor).
50. JOHNSON, supra note 1,at 44, 50-52.
51. For example, William McCalpin, one of the chief protagonists of the ABA's
involvement with the OEO from 1964 to 1967 and chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on
Lawyer Referral, had little exposure to legal aid. Id. at 45, 49.
52. The concern about non-lawyers providing legal services arose from Sargent Shriver's
speech in 1964 of the "supermarkets of social service" that would include "legal advocates for the
poor." Id. at 50. The "supermarkets" concept was based on the premise that local planning bodies
called community action agencies (CAAs) would decide how to address the problems of the poor
in their particular communities with government-provided money. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra
note 43, at 7. CAAs could choose to include legal services programs as part of their efforts;
however, in practice, most CAAs deferred to existing legal aid organizations and used the money
to address other social issues. Id. at 7, 10. The Cahns believed that a separate legal services arm
with local bar involvement was necessary to supplement local CAA plans. JOHNSON, supra note
1, at 54. The ABA's position was that local legal services programs should not be controlled by
non-lawyers, whether on the local, statewide, or national level. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note
43, at 7. CAAs were part of the Community Action Program, one of the groups within the OEO.
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 65.
53. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 58.

54. Id. at 55. Two years prior, the U.S. Supreme Court held that states were responsible to
provide counsel in criminal cases. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Shortly after the
Gideon decision, statewide public defender systems began to appear. GIRTH, supra note 30, at 3.
In 1964, Congress passed the Criminal Justice Act, which provided federal payments to defense
counsel in federal cases, and the Economic Opportunity Act, which included the first attempt to
secure lawyers in civil cases for the poor. Id.
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conference to quiet any lingering opposition to the resolution by
Main Street lawyers and their colleagues involved with the legal aid
societies."
However, Main Street lawyers were not the only group of
attorneys with concerns. The National Legal Aid and Defender
Association (NLADA) represented legal aid providers whose input
was not significantly included in the development of a national legal
services program.56 NLADA's objection arose from a gathering of
legal aid providers with architects of the OEO program who
condemned existing legal aid organizations as ineffective. " Such
statements completely alienated NLADA members from further
conversations with the OEO about a national program; " however,
the ABA's lobby of NLADA was so strong that at the 1965 ABA
Conference, NLADA's president was prepared to defend the federal
proposal. 5
In September 1965, E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., accepted the role
as the first director of OEO's LSP, tasked with determining the
specifics of a federal legal services program.6' Bamberger worked
55. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 59-64.

56. Some of the discord between traditional legal aid providers and those involved in
developing the federal model is traced to a November 1964 legal services conference sponsored
by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in Washington, D.C. The conference
brought together individuals from three experimental legal services programs financed by the
Ford Foundation and the Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Development (OJD). Id. at
44-45. The speakers at this conference were social reformists who advocated a different legal aid
model from the one in existence. Their comments attacked the established legal aid movement,
and the legal aid advocates in attendance were insulted. Id. at 47-49.
57. NLADA's Executive Committee did not support the creation of separate programs under
the OEO; however, it issued a statement in December 1964 that stated its position that
[w]ith ample funds, traditional legal aid and defender organizations can be broadened
to meet the full legal needs of indigent people in metropolitan centers. The creation of
separate, duplicating agencies to offer legal services under Economic Opportunity
programs will be more costly and less effective than will the proper use of existing
facilities, and serious ethical questions will be raised where nonlawyers attempt to
practice law.
Id. at 48-49.
58. Id. at 49.
59. Id. at 63 (stating that NLADA President Ted Voorhees was prepared "to answer every
conceivable objection any delegate could possibly raise").
60. Id. at 69. One of the principal architects of the OEO's legal services program, Jean Cahn,
resigned from the OEO on April 1, 1965, because, in stark disagreement with the OEO's
Community Action Program (CAP) director, she believed the legal services program should not
be subordinated to non-lawyer control. Id. at 64-65. Bamberger, a partner in one of Baltimore's
largest law firms who had no previous legal aid experience and only peripheral involvement in
local bar activities, was recommended by the ABA to fill the vacancy. Id. at 67-70.
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with the National Advisory Committee to produce the OEO's Legal
Services Guidelines (the "OEO Guidelines"). 61 Among other
requirements, the OEO Guidelines mandated that the poor be
represented on the boards of local programs and prohibited local
programs from taking fee-generating cases, and prohibited
advocating for legislative reform.6 2 The OEO Guidelines also
insisted on convenient office hours in neighborhood-accessible
offices that offered preventive law and client education programs. 63
The OEO's legal services program was based on a staff attorney
model whereby full-time attorneys working for legal aid
organizations would provide legal services to the poor. These and
similar organizations would be supported by a network of national
and state support centers that would provide staff attorneys with the
training and information necessary to advance a legal strategy for the
poor. 65 The vision for a national legal services program was now in
place, but what was still lacking was support from legal aid
advocates and those members of the private bar not represented by
the ABA leadership.
In November 1965, Bamberger and other supporters of the OEO
plan attended the NLADA annual conference to obtain support from
legal aid practitioners. 66 The reception from legal aid advocates was
not welcoming. 6' Despite the antagonism, LSP supporters engaged
the legal aid group in a day-long conversation that helped to open the
door to legal aid programs across the country. 68 At the end of the
day, the parties agreed that more needed to be done to provide legal
61.

HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 8.

62. Id. at 9.
63. Id. The members of the committee included ABA President Lewis Powell, NLADA
President Theodore Voorhees, Jean Cahn, and Gary G. Bellow. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 107.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 74-76.
67. Id. at 74-75. The chairman of the board of a local legal aid program expressed the
programs' shared reluctance to the proposed LSP when he responded to Bamberger's speech at
the 1965 NLADA conference:
Other authorities, grown old in the service of Legal Aid, still are skeptical about the
takeover by public and political authorities of the civil Legal Aid institution. Many of
you are genuinely concerned about the implications of support by public funds of an
enterprise essentially the responsibility of the community and specifically of its
members of the bar.
Id. at 76.
68. See id. at 78-79.
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assistance to the poor.69 Although the ABA was successful in
containing the dissidence of the private bar at its 1965 meeting, the
private bar's objections continued-and were perhaps heightenedas the OEO's plan for civil legal services developed.
B. The StaffModel versus Judicare:
Policy andPoliticalRationales (1966-1980)
The national legal services program began to develop without
the input of the majority of practicing attorneys in the United States,
including those who engaged in legal aid as part of their practice.
This exclusion aggravated the private bar's distrust of the federal
government and its expanding role in the provision of legal
services. 70 Despite these voiced concerns, the OEO and the ABA
moved forward with their LSP plan without properly addressing the
concerns and needs of private lawyers who had been integral to the
provision of legal aid for the previous ninety years.
Private attorneys began to support the concept of federal legal
aid as a result of a national speech circuit organized by ABA and
OEO leaders. " The principal selling point for private attorneys was
that any group could obtain federal funding by submitting an
application; however, the application process itself reinforced the
skepticism held by the private bar.72 Because the OEO required
funding applications to include community input," rifts arose among
community action agencies (CAAs); " lawyers, local bar
associations, and their members; and community interest groups."
Although most of these conflicts were eventually set aside for the

69. See id. at 79.
70. The OEO program was also constructed without the full participation of existing legal
aid lawyers and private attorneys who contributed their skills to individual clients and delivered
legal services to the poor. See supra Part II; see also JOHNSON, supra note 1,at 17-19 (discussing
McCarthy-era fears of "socialization of the legal profession" in America and their effect on the
development of federal legal aid).
71. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 80-82.

at 82-84.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 83.
74. See generally supra note 52 (discussing the role of CAAs in the development of the legal
aid apparatus).
75. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 84-86 (describing the structure and goals of the
parties in conflict).
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sake of funding,"6 the issue of program design-the greatest conflict
of all-continued to shape the debate over the next fifteen years.
Several local bar associations and lawyer groups composed of
Main Street lawyers submitted proposals premised on private
lawyers receiving federal funds to take on cases for low-income
clients." The government subsidy of private attorney work for lowincome clients, referred to as "Judicare," was already a popular
practice in a few European countries." Several Judicare proposals
were submitted to the OEO for consideration; however, OEO
leadership was already predisposed to using a staff attorney model
because they did not trust the private bar to advocate zealously for
poor clients. 7
In considering the Judicare model, the OEO foresaw potential
conflicts of interest between private attorneys and their existing
clients-particularly in smaller communities where the handful of
practicing attorneys represented landlords, local businesses, and
other fee-paying clients. o In addition, the OEO was concerned that
Main Street lawyers did not have the expertise necessary to represent
the poor and that public money may encourage the most marginal
attorneys to participate in the program. " From a regulation
standpoint, the OEO also predicted that private attorneys would resist
the federal program because of its threat to the self-regulatory nature
of the legal profession. 2 In fact, a significant segment of the private
bar feared that the intervention of the federal government would
force the profession to relinquish control over how legal services

76. See generally id. at 87-94 (describing the administrative and political pressure that
lawyer groups applied to the OEO and the resolution of the above-mentioned conflicts).
77. One early proposal, which resulted in a stand-off, came from San Bernardino County in
California, where the local bar association and the local CAA agreed that the Judicare model
would best suit the needs of the community. Id. at 85. The OEO rejected this proposal on the
ground that it did not reflect the staff attorney model. See id. at 85-86. The local bar association
refused to amend its proposal because its members did not agree with such a model. Id. at 86.
78. See Richard L. Abel, Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA

L. REv. 474, 475 (1985) ("Britain was the first nation to accept [civil legal aid] as a governmental
responsibility in 1949, followed by the Netherlands in 1957 . . .
79. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 10.

80. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 117-21 (discussing the inception of Judicare
and the alleged negative aspects of allowing private attorneys to participate in the program).
81. Id. at ll8-19.
82. See id. at 117-21.
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were delivered, thereby opening the door to regulation of the
profession at large."
Many Judicare advocates did not believe that the legal services
delivery program should utilize federal funds for social reform
purposes for fear that it would encourage the socialization of the
legal profession.84 Advocates also emphasized the importance of
allowing clients, including the poor, to have the freedom to choose
their attorney, as opposed to having an assigned staff attorney
imposed upon them."
Judicare opponents86 countered that because most of the clients
whom the new program targeted did not live in metropolitan areas
where the majority of attorneys practiced, they were already
constrained in their choices.t " More importantly, because the
Judicare model was an individual rather than a collective model,
opponents argued that it was not an ideal vehicle for promoting the
83. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 10. The private bar continues to balk at the
thought of regulating the legal profession, pointing to the importance of lawyer autonomy in
preserving democratic principles and to the financial and ethical difficulties experienced by
doctors with the advent of HMOs. See generally George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics
of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services and What We Can Learnfrom the Medical Profession's
Shift to a CorporateParadigm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 809-18 (2001) (describing the history
of restrictions on the medical profession). A 2009 survey about the unauthorized practice of law
(UPL) found that at least twenty-nine states enforce regulations against UPL. ABA STANDING
COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION, 2009 SURVEY OF UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEES
1 (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/09-upl-survey.pdf ("Twenty-nine
jurisdictions actively enforce UPL regulations, although some jurisdictions indicate that
insufficient funding makes enforcement difficult.").
84. See generally Michael Bennett & Cruz Reynoso, California Rural Legal Assistance
(CRLA): Survival of a Poverty Law Practice, 1 CHICANO L. REV. 1 (1972) (describing the
creation of, political resistance to, and survival of the California Rural Legal Assistance project,
which aimed to assist migrant workers in California in accessing the justice system).
85. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 238. The medical profession experienced a similar
transformation, which resulted in the creation of Medicare in 1965. See Gail B. Agrawal &
Howard R. Veit, Back to the Future: The Managed Care Revolution, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 11, 12-16 (2002) (outlining the history of Medicare). Medicare allowed the federal
government to exercise control over the practice of medicine, which led to the enactment of the
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2006), and the introduction of
the HMO. See Agrawal & Veit, supra, at 16-20. Even though the legal and medical professions
were going through parallel changes, attorneys were better positioned to defend their profession
because many members of Congress were also members of the bar. See Congress Merge, Power
Search, http://www.congressmerge.com/onlinedb/powersearch.htm (select "Profession" and then
search using "attorney," "lawyer," "physician," and "doctor" as keywords) (showing that there
are currently 187 members of Congress who are lawyers and only 13 who are doctors).
86. The opposition to Judicare came primarily from leaders of NLADA, the OEO, and the
ABA. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 117-21 (discussing the nature of Judicare
opposition).
87. Id. at 238.
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social change agenda that the national civil legal services program
was designed to advance." Additionally, opponents worried that
private lawyers lacked sufficient poverty law experience, that only
the lowest-quality lawyers would participate,8 9 and that the program
would be too costly."
In an effort to quiet the demands of Judicare advocates, 9 1 the
OEO made some concessions and funded a handful of pilot programs
in Wisconsin, Connecticut, and California. 92 These Judicare
programs were mainly implemented in rural areas where populations
were diffuse and a staff attorney program was less feasible. "
The considerable tension between LSP and Main Street lawyers
was not solely based on support-or there lack of-for the provision
of legal services to the poor. Many of the attorneys who objected to
the staff attorney model already served low- and moderate-income
clients and viewed the OEO-funded attorneys as outsiders, with
imperialist views and without connections to local bar
organizations.
Attorneys also questioned whether group
representation and impact litigation were prompted by the needs of

88. Id. at 120.
89. See Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM L.

REv. 719, 729-40 (2001) (discussing the existing hierarchy within the legal profession); see also
Louise Trubek & M. Elizabeth Kransberger, CriticalLawyers: Social Justice and the Structures
of Private Practice, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITIES 201, 202-03 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) (discussing the
historical division between public interest and private bar public service practice).
90. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 120.

91. Perhaps one of the best-coordinated national efforts to replace the OEO's preferred staff
model with a Judicare model was led by Al Cohn, president-elect of the American Trial Lawyers
Association, a competitor of the ABA. See JOHNSON, supra note 1,at 95-98.
92. Id. at 120-21.
93. See id. at 326 n.29. Although other entities submitted Judicare proposals to the OEO, the
Wisconsin State Bar Association, which coordinated political support for the Judicare model,
forced the question of whether Judicare models should receive federal funding. See id. at 117-18.
94. GIRTH, supra note 30, at 79-86 (describing the private bar's view of OEO attorneys in
three New Jersey cities). The view that OEO lawyers were "hippie imperialists" was further
exacerbated by the funding of the Reginald Heber Smith Fellowship, which attracted both recent
graduates from elite law schools and young lawyers from prestigious law firms to work on law
reform issues in low-income communities for a term of one to two years. See Deborah J. Cantrell,
The Obligation of Legal Aid Lawyers to Champion Practice by Nonlawyers, 73 FORDHAM L.

REv. 883, 899-901 (2004) ("Under the program, called the Reginald Heber Smith Community
Lawyer Fellowship Program, the fellows quickly became known as 'Reggies' and were placed
throughout the country to help legal aid offices become part of the new national network of
poverty advocates." (citation omitted)). See generally JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 178-80
(describing the Reginald Heber Smith Fellowship Program).
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the clients or by the desires of LSP attorneys." Local bar members
accused LSP attorneys of creating greater conflict in their cases
because there was no economic incentive for resolution.96 There
were also members of the private bar who believed that even the
poor could pay something for legal services if they were gainfully
employed." Minority lawyers, many of whom represented poor
clients, also raised concerns because they distrusted the established
bar to guard their economic interests." The numerous concerns of
the private bar were exacerbated by LSP's unwillingness to engage
with the Main Street lawyers. 99
Ultimately, a system of salaried attorneys triumphed over a
Judicare model. LSP architects believed a staff attorney model,
supported by a system of nationally controlled local centers
providing lawyers with training and leadership development was a
more effective route to combat the ills of poverty and transform the
entrenched local entities protecting the status quo. ' By the time
Richard Nixon took office in 1969, there were at least 260 LSPfunded programs, operating in every state except North Dakota. '0'
95. In 1967, the OEO made law reform for the poor a principal priority of the funding of
legal services programs. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 11.
96. GIRTH, supra note 30, at 84. One attorney was quoted saying, "There is no question in
my mind that the program stirs up litigation and matrimonial discord. They give bad advice when
they tell people to get a divorce." Id.
97. Originally some of the OEO's members proposed that eligibility for its legal services
program be aligned with the poverty standards in the United States. Id. at 112. This proposal met
fierce opposition from NAC, NLADA, and other proponents of legal aid. Id. at 112-13. These
groups favored the higher eligibility standards that were based on more factors than simple
income. Id. The final OEO Legal Services Guidelines provided that a flexible standard should
apply and free services should not be provided to an organization or a group of individuals if it
could afford legal care by pooling resources. Id. at 115-16. Factors in evaluating the ability to pay
included "the size of the organization, the relative poverty of the members of the organization,
and the cost of the legal assistance [desired]." Id.
98. Id. at 85.
99. See id. at 122.

100. Id. at 119 (describing the "low regard for the calibre and motives of the practitioners
most likely to represent the poor under [a Judicare] system").
101. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 11. The governor of North Dakota, a Democrat,
exercised his right to veto the OEO program due to private lawyers' opposition to the program.
OEO Director Shriver could have overridden such a veto, but he refused to override his colleague.
JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 91. The issue of governor vetoes was taken up by California Senator
George Murphy in 1969 when he attempted to pass an amendment giving governors absolute veto
rights. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 14-15. Although the absolute veto right failed to

garner sufficient support from members of the House of Representatives, the veto remained a
strong weapon in an acting governor's effort to stop or postpone funding to OEO programs. For
an overview, see id. at 15-16.
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The OEO legal aid organizations were guided by the principles
that (1) the client community consisted of only poor people; (2)
clients were to control the decisions about how to address their
problems; (3) law reform was crucial to address the historical
exclusion of poor people from institutions of power; (4) advocacy of
the collective need was superior to advocacy of the individual
need; 102 and (5) a complete range of legal services should be
available to the poor. "' By all accounts, LSP envisioned by the OEO
led to great protections and increased rights for the poor. " To the
extent they were successful, the programs met with resistance from
those individuals and institutions whose power was now threatened
by formidable opponents representing the poor against government
entities, private corporations, and other elites. 105
The growing resistance to the OEO's efforts eventually became
a topic of debate within the Nixon administration. 10' Although the
debate over LSP was portrayed by conservatives as an opportunity to
revisit the Judicare discussion, the impetus was actually a series of
adverse court decisions against industries and governmental agencies
that had been unaccustomed to opposition from the poor. '1 The
largest battle over the role of the private bar was played out in
California and led by its then state governor Ronald Reagan.
After a number of successful lawsuits against government
entities and agribusiness interests, the California Rural Legal
Assistance (CRLA) program, the first OEO LSP to serve rural areas
statewide, 1' came under attack. 109 The attacks resulted in a
102. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 6 (2002) (emphasizing the

obligation of the legal profession to provide legal services to individual clients).
103. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 12-13.

104. Among the most notable accomplishments of the early legal aid program were the
implementations of social security income, the WIC program, Medicaid, the Food Stamp
Program, and protections for tenants and consumers. Id. at 13-14. Additionally, LSP had
significant judicial victories in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (providing for court remedies
against administrators of benefit programs), Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 638 (1969) (holding
that welfare recipients cannot be denied benefits arbitrarily), and Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (establishing procedural due process rights in terminations of certain social services).
105. See

HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 14-17

(outlining the significant

controversies that arose as a result of political efforts to restrain OEO activities).
106. Nixon took office in January 1969 and delayed appointing a new national legal services
director until his administration assessed the OEO generally. GIRTH, supra note 30, at 95.
107. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 14-15.

108. Bennett & Reynoso, supra note 84, at 2. The initial allocation of federal funds for CRLA
was $1.27 million in 1966. Id. at 2 n.2.
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gubernatorial veto of a $1.8 million grant of funds to the
organization. "o Governor Ronald Reagan justified his veto by citing
to multiple allegations of misconduct by CRLA, which were later
detailed in a report by the director of the California OEO. "'
In 1971, an appointed commission cleared CRLA of any
misconduct, and the OEO agreed to award California a $2.5 million
grant for pilot Judicare programs in exchange for Reagan's
agreement to withdraw his veto. 112 However, the $2.5 million
allocation never materialized because of a decade-long dispute over
which evaluation criteria should be used "' and which delivery
system best addressed the needs of the poor. 114 The debate over
national legal services was so great that in 1971, ABA leaders, a
bipartisan group in Congress, and the President's Advisory Council
on Executive Reorganization agreed to transfer the functions of the
OEO's LSP to a new, private nonprofit corporation. " The new
organization would receive and distribute federal funds to legal
services programs and would be "immune to political pressures." 116
C. PrivateAttorney Involvement in the
LSC Era: 1972-Present

The debate about Judicare and the role of government subsidies
for private attorneys continued to shape the national discourse about
legal services for the poor. The arguments became more
sophisticated as purely ideological arguments yielded to qualitative
and quantitative studies that assessed the effectiveness of various

109. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 15-16.
110. See id. The Econonmic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2834, gave state governors the
right to veto antipoverty grants. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 91
Ilt. Id. The OEO appointed a commission of three Republican judges from Colorado, Maine,
and Oregon to address the many charges of misconduct alleged in the Uhler report. See Bennett &
Reynoso, supra note 84, at 55-56; see also HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 15.

112. Bennett & Reynoso, supra note 84, at 69-70.
113. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 15-16.
114. See Bennett & Reynoso, supra note 84, at 70-79.
115. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 19. The other option the parties considered
was eliminating the legal services program altogether. See id. at 16-17 (detailing the efforts of
OEO Director Howard Phillips to dismantle the legal services program).
116. Id. at 19 (quoting President Nixon). At the same time, President Nixon proposed that the
OEO impose restrictions on lobbying, organizing, and other political activities of its staff
attorneys. Id.
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delivery systems. 117 Such studies were critical to the successful
advocacy for the continuation of a national legal services program
under the Nixon administration. One of these reports, published in
January 1972 by the Bureau of Social Science Research, focused on
the evaluation of four Judicare programs in rural areas: Wisconsin
Judicare, Pine Tree Legal Assistance of Maine, Michigan's Upper
Peninsula Legal Services, and Colorado Rural Legal Services. "' The
report criticized the OEO for not conducting a serious study of these
pilot Judicare projects; it also noted that the lack of comparable
programs in urban areas prevented it from making a determination
about whether a Judicare model would work in cities. "'
The American Bar Foundation also sponsored a study on the
Wisconsin Judicare program. Its author, Samuel J. Brakel, issued a
preliminary report on Judicare in November 1972 120 to respond to the
"considerable attention in academic and political circles" about "the
merits of the Judicare model for delivering legal services to [the]
poor." 121 Characterizing the debate as "taking place with little or no
reference to the facts," 122 he wrote that the "substantive weaknesses"
of previous studies "derive[d] from the fact that too little time and
money [were] made available for them." 123 Because the Wisconsin
Judicare program was the principal Judicare model in the country, he
reasoned that a thorough understanding of the program was pivotal to

117. Under the Nixon administration, the OEO commissioned delivery system studies to
evaluate over two hundred legal services field offices by interviewing project stakeholders,
including directors, attorneys, community and social service representatives, and local bar
members. See infra note 130.
118. LEONARD H. GOODMAN & JACQUES FEUILLAN, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE
PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE RURAL POOR: JUDICARE AND THE DECENTRALIZED
STAFF PROGRAM 8 (1972).

119. The report states in its introduction:
For some unknown reason, there has never been a serious, systematic, much less
scientific, published study of any single OLS-funded program. The OLS probably
should have sponsored a small-scale controlled experiment with Judicare, such as the
[Department of Health, Education and Welfare] is now conducting in Meriden,
Connecticut, or, at least, a rigorously scientific comparative study of one Judicare and
one staff program in similar settings. Either would have yielded more definitive
answers to the question of their relative efficacy than the present report can supply.
Id. at 9 n.4.
120. SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, WISCONSIN JUDICARE: A PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL 1 (1972).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id at 114.
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the debate, particularly because the program worked. 124 Brakel's
report included an appendix laying out the different arguments for
and against Judicare, arguments that Brakel referred to as "absurd
propaganda." 125
In 1974, Brakel issued a final report, which included a study of
Judicare programs in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Montana. 126 The
report found that, on virtually every measurement, Judicare
compared favorably with the staff attorney model. 127 Brakel blamed
the reluctance of OEO leadership to give Judicare projects a fair shot
for the "drastic curtailment-an emasculation-of efforts to provide
legal services to the poor." 128 The report urged that Judicare be
adopted nationwide as the primary delivery model with staffed
offices as a supplement to it, 129 and offered evaluation methods and
cost estimates for testing these proposed delivery models. 130 Thus, on
the brink of the creation of the Legal Services Corporation (LSC),
Brakel had effectively called for a reversal of federal policy.
Brakel wrote at a time when the Nixon administration and
Congress were debating the continuation of a federal legal services
program. His study referenced the Legal Services Corporation Act,
which had passed one arm of Congress in June 1973, and included
restrictions on the use of federal funds in lawsuits concerning
abortion, school desegregation, selective service, and juvenile
issues. 13' These restrictions were later included in the new legal
services program created by the Legal Services Corporation Act of

124. See id. at 1-3, 109-10. At the time of the report, the Wisconsin Judicare experiment, first
funded in 1966, served twenty-eight counties and an estimated total population of 600,000
people. Id. at 3.
125. Id. at 115-16. He also admonished "[tihose who ... characterize Wisconsin Judicare as
a failure or dismiss the Judicare approach as misguided" for being ignorant of the program's
accomplishments and "adversely influenced by the personalities or politics of 'friends' of
Judicare." Id. at 110.
126.

SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, JUDICARE: PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS, AND POOR PEOPLE

12 (1974).
127. Id. at 123-29.
128. Id. at 2-3 & n.6.
129. Id. at 2-3.
130. Id. at 17-23, 113-15. The OEO commissioned the Urban Institute to develop evaluation
designs beginning in March 1974, and the report was published in January 1975. LEONA M.
vOGT ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN OPTIONS TO TEST VARIOUS APPROACHES TO DELIVERING
LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR (1975).

131. BRAKEL, supra note 126, at 2 n.4.
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1974 (the "LSC Act of 1974"). 132 The new legislation continued the
tradition of a staff attorney system; however, it established LSC as an
independent, bipartisan, and nonprofit organization with an elevenmember board of directors. '" The transformation of the OEO's LSP
into LSC in October 1975 stripped the OEO of its local support
centers; it restricted lobbying and rulemaking abilities; and it limited
the types of cases attorneys were allowed to take. 1' Although the
newly created LSC was more bureaucratic and restricted, it remained
similar in structure to its predecessor, LSP. "
Judicare proponents continued to advocate for a private attorney
model that delivered legal services to the poor. 136 Conservatives
opposed to social advocacy strategies successfully lobbied for a
mandated study of Judicare and other private attorney models in the
LSC Act of 1974. 137 The LSC study-the 1980 Delivery Systems
Study (DSS)-looked at thirty-eight demonstration projects,
including fourteen Judicare projects, one private attorney voucher
program, six pre-paid insurance programs, nine contracts with
private law firms, two legal clinics, and six organized pro bono
projects. ' The DSS compared these demonstration projects with
sixty randomly selected staff attorney programs. It concluded that
overall, none of the alternative models performed better than the staff
attorney model; 1' however, it found that the three most viable of
132. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2996 (2006)); see also HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 21-22.
133. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 22. The board is appointed by the U.S. president
and confirmed by the Senate, and no more than six of the eleven members may belong to the
same political party. Id.
134. Id. at 30. Because President Nixon resigned only weeks after signing the LSC Act of
1974, the initial board was not sworn in until a year after its creation. Id. at 22.
135. Idat23.
136. Prompted by efforts of the private bar, OEO and LSC grantees began to experiment with
private attorney models in the 1970s. KEN SMITH, PRIVATE ATTORNEY INVOLVEMENT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE 1982-83 TEN PERCENT REQUIREMENT 6 (1984).
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(g). Congress allocated approximately $13 million over a fouryear period to examine all of the systems for delivery of publicly funded civil legal assistance to
the poor. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A POLICY REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (1980). The LSC Act of 1974 required
an independent study of various alternatives to the existing, staff attorney delivery system,
including "judicare, vouchers, prepaid legal insurance, and contracts with law firms"; however, it
made no mention of pro bono programs. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(g); see also LEGAL SERVS. CORP.,
DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 3-6 (1980).
138. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 137, at 37 tbl.1.
139. Id. at 8.
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those alternatives were Judicare, contracts with law firms, and
organized pro bono. 140 The DSS concluded that, although "pure
Judicare" programs did not seem viable, 141 private attorneys were
able to provide high-quality, cost-effective civil legal services. 142
As a result of the DSS and President Reagan's threat to
eliminate LSC altogether, Congress mandated that LSC-funded
programs devote a portion of their grants to private bar
involvement. "' Although the DSS did not yield scientific evidence
concluding that a private attorney model was better than a staff
attorney model, it created an opportunity for local bar organizations
and private attorneys to experiment with private attorney models. "
Given President Reagan's history of antagonism toward the OEO
' it was clear
and CRLA during his tenure as governor of California, 45
that a national legal services program would not survive unless there
was a meaningful partnership with the private bar. 146
In 1981, the same year that Congress reduced LSC's funding by
25 percent, "' LSC's Board of Directors passed a resolution requiring
grantees to use 10 percent of their LSC funds for private attorney

140. Id. at 88 tbl.17.
141. Id.
142. Id.; see also Alan W. Houseman, Legal Services to the Poor and Disadvantagedin the
1980's: The Issues for Research, in RESEARCH ON LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR AND
DISADVANTAGED: LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE 21 (Bryant G. Garth

ed., 1983). The DSS and Section 1007(h) of the Legal Services Corporation Act Amendments of
1977 both provided guidelines under which private attorney models could work. Legal Services
Corporation Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-222, §§ 9-10, 91 Stat. 1619, (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996f). Section 1007(h) also called for a study of special groups,
including veterans, migrant farm workers, Native Americans, people with limited English ability,
rural residents, the elderly, the handicapped, and the institutionalized. Id. § 13. The DSS
supported a decentralized structure, which would allow local priority setting that would better
account for the needs of special groups. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 137, at 6-11.
143. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 25.
144. SMITH, supra note 136, at 5; see also Andrea J. Saltzman, PrivateBar Delivery of Civil
Legal Services to the Poor: A Design for a Combined Private Attorney and Staffed Office
Delivery System, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1165 (1983) (describing the disagreement between

proponents of a staffed office legal services program and of a Judicare model, and proposing a
mixed model).
145. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 14-16.

146. SMITH, supra note 136, at 4 ("When the Legal Services Corporation bill was making its
way through Congress in the mid-'70s, the debate over judicare became a major issue. A potential
hurdle to passage was avoided when language was inserted in the bill calling for a comprehensive
study ofjudicare and other delivery models that utilized the private bar as alternatives to the staff
attorney model.").
147. Id. at 16.
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involvement (PAI) programs. 148 The 10 percent instruction resulted
from the partnership between LSC programs and a private bar that
feared being overwhelmed by requests for free services if LSC were
eliminated.1" The 10 percent instruction was flexible, and it was
introduced as a special condition to funding for which a waiver was
available if sufficient effort was made to meet the target. " By
contrast, the 12.5 percent instruction was a minimum threshold
mandate with accompanying reporting and auditing requirements as
conditions to the receipt of annual funding for legal services
programs. "'

Legal aid advocates who regarded the private bar as "a
predominantly conservative force hostile to legal services work
[were] proven wrong in 1981 when the organized bar rose in
opposition to President Reagan's attempts to abolish legal
services." 152 This experience and Reagan's hostility to legal services
forced many legal services advocates to look toward the private bar
for ideas and resources that might fill any gaps resulting from LSC
cuts.

1'

The PAI component did not specify how private attorneys could
be involved, but possible models included Judicare, private attorney
contracts, and pro bono. The 10 percent instruction provided
additional opportunities to bring legal services advocates and the
private bar together for training programs that demonstrated or
reinforced the importance of collaboration. 1' Within months, LSC
reported that 88 percent of its programs had implemented a PAI
component; however, a significant majority of those programs were
primarily pro bono models. 1' Between 1980 and 1982, the number
148. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 25.
149. Id. at 24-25; Abel, supra note 78, at 508.
150. GERRY

SINGSEN,

ACCOUNTING

UNDER

THE NEW

12.5%

PRIVATE

ATTORNEY

INVOLVEMENT REGULATION 13 (1984).
151. Id.; see also SMITH, supra note 136, at 43.
152. SMITH, supra note 136, at 6.
153. Id.
154. The 10 percent instruction was challenged at different levels by legal services programs.
For example, in a suit by the National Senior Citizens Law Center, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia held that the 10 percent instruction was invalid because it did not go through
a rule-making process that included a note-and-comment period before its promulgation. Nat'l
Senior Citizens Law Ctr., Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 581 F. Supp. 1362, 1368-69 (D.D.C. 1984),
afl'd on other grounds, 751 F.2d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
155. SMITH, supra note 136, at 7.
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of private attorneys involved in federally funded legal services
programs quadrupled; 156 however, Judicare programs remained
marginal. 11
By 1985, organizations receiving LSC funding were instructed
to devote 12.5 percent of their budget to private attorney
involvement. 15' The 12.5 percent PAl mandate has remained a staple
of LSC-funded programs and has served as the impetus for hundreds
of programs across the country involving the private bar. 159
While the proponents of the PAI provision intended it to support
a fee-for-service component, currently, LSC grantees primarily
allocate PAI funds to coordinate the private bar in pro bono
efforts. 160 A review of LSC's PAI Action Plan, which provides
direction to LSC-funded programs through 2010, does not once
mention any Judicare-type model, although it cites pro bono efforts
at least a dozen times. '6' Although none of the approximately 138
legal aid programs that receive funding from LSC 162 have their PAI
programs posted on LSC's website, it seems likely that only a
handful of these organizations are utilizing the 12.5 percent PAI
allocation to pay the private bar for providing civil legal services to
the poor. The Wisconsin program is the only OEO-era Judicare
experiment that has survived and is still operational today. 163 The
156. Id.
157. A study of the implementation of programs during the first two years of the 10 percent
instruction revealed that while 35 percent of programs operated a Judicare component along with
pro bono, only 15 percent were strictly Judicare programs. Id.
158. 45 C.F.R. § 1614.1 (2008) ("Except as provided hereafter, a recipient of Legal Services
Corporation funding shall devote an amount equal to at least twelve and one-half percent
(12.5%) of the recipient's LSC annualized basic field award to the involvement of private
attorneys in such delivery of legal services .... ).
159. The 12.5 percent instruction was a minimum threshold mandate with accompanying
reporting and auditing requirements as conditions to the receipt of annual funding for legal
services programs. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 136, at 43.
160. For information on LSC-funded PAI programs, see LSC Resource Information, PAl
Written Plans, http://www.1ri.1sc.gov/probono/pai-written-plan.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
161. See

LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LSC 2007 ACTION PLAN FOR PRIVATE ATTORNEY

INVOLVEMENT, http://www.ri.1sc.gov/LRILSC_2007_ActionPlan-for.PAI.pdf (last visited
Sept. 14, 2009). The mantra of the report is "Help Close the Justice Gap, Unleash the Power of
Pro Bono." Id.
162. Houseman, supra note 19, at 40. Houseman estimates that there were approximately 864
legal aid programs throughout the country. Id. at 40 n.21. This figure includes law school clinical
programs. Id.
163. In May 2007, University of Maryland School of Law Professor Michael Millemann
provided a brief overview of Judicare programs in the United States in a report to the Maryland
State Bar Association in support of the state's efforts to launch a Judicare program. See MICHAEL
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only other LSC-funded program that uses Judicare as its primary
form of delivering legal services to the poor is located in rural
Minnesota.

1"

A portion of the legal aid community survived deep cuts in
federal funding in the early 1980s and mid-i 990s in large part due to
the promulgation of pro bono programs, 1' creative funding schemes
generated by interest rates on lawyer escrow accounts, '66 and the
efforts of state justice committees. 167 However, the federal legal aid
that exists today is not structured as originally envisioned by the
architects of the OEO. Opponents of LSC have limited its capacity
for social reform by restricting the ability of legal aid organizations
that receive federal funds to file class actions, recover attorneys'
fees, represent undocumented people, and sue governmental

MILLEMANN, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE POTENTIAL USE OF PRIVATE
LAWYERS, WHO ARE PAID REDUCED FEES BY A LEGAL SERVICES FUNDER, TO REPRESENT
Low-INCOME PERSONS IN MARYLAND WHO CAN NOT OBTAIN LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CIVIL

CASES 71 (2007), http://www.msba.org/sec-comm/sections/diserv/minutes/RFLSPFinalReport
FINAL.pdf. Millemann reports that the Wisconsin Judicare program is the primary provider of
free legal services in northern Wisconsin and that the program includes approximately two
hundred participating private attorneys, as well as eight staff attorneys who provide back-up
assistance. Id. at 71-72.
164. See id. at 78-79. For more information on Minnesota's Judicare program, see Legal
Services of Northwest Minnesota, www.1snmlaw.org (last visited Sept. 14, 2009). Georgia and
Virginia are the only other LSC-funded legal services programs with a Judicare component.
MILLEMANN, supra note 163, at 80-81. The Judicare program in Georgia serves primarily rural
areas with high poverty and is part of a larger legal aid program called the Pro Bono Project that
is co-sponsored by the Georgia State Bar. Id. at 80; see also State Bar of Ga., Pro Bono Project,
http://www.gabar.org/related-organizations/pro-bono-project/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2009). The
Southwest Virginia Legal Aid Society works with a centralized staff that conducts intake,
assesses cases, determines eligibility, and refers clients to private attorneys. See MILLEMANN,
supra note 163, at 80-81; see also Southwest Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc., SVLAS Mission
Statement, http://www.svlas.orglindex.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
165. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 33. The ABA Standing Committee on Pro

Bono and Public Service has been the key to establishing the ABA's position on pro bono
activities. See generally ABA Standing Comm. on Pro Bono & Public Serv.,
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/home.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2009). The
Standing Committee on Pro Bono sponsors annual Equal Justice Conferences, ABA, Equal
Justice Conference, http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/ejc/home.html (last visited Sept. 14,
2009), annual Pro Bono Publico Awards, ABA, Pro Bono Awards, http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/probono/navawards.shtnl (last visited Sept. 14, 2009), a National Pro Bono
Celebration, National Pro Bono Celebration, http://www.probono.net/celebrateprobono/ (last
visited Sept. 14, 2009), and a Center for Pro Bono that coordinates five pro bono projects, ABA,
Center for Pro Bono Projects, http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/nav-projects.shtml
(last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
166. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 43, at 34.

167. See id. at 42-43.
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agencies. ' Consequently, the political lobbying and social change
components that were part of the early vision of a salaried-attorney
legal aid program are not possible under existing federal regulations.
Instead of merely acquiescing to this limited framework, legal
services advocates must be creative and entrepreneurial in their
efforts, especially as state and local governments are cutting support
for legal aid programs. 169 Law firms that have traditionally helped
subsidize pro bono projects are either disappearing or laying off
attorneys in droves. 170 Moreover, funds earned through the Interest
on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program have reached dismal
lows with the lowering of interest rates. "' While traditional sources
for legal services funding decrease, demand for legal assistance in
the areas of consumer protection, family conflicts, and government
benefits continue to increase. 172 With few exceptions, state and
federal governments do not appear to treat legal services as a priority
in this time of fiscal constraint that encourages any long-term
expectation of increased funding. "
168. See id. at 29-33 (providing a full discussion of LSC restrictions).
169. See id. at 6-9; see also Vickrey, Dunn & Kelso, supra note 25, at 1154-57 (describing
how the state budget crisis led to major cuts for the courts and the administration ofjustice); Press
Release, Legal Aid Ass'n of Cal., Significant Changes to Governor's Legal Representation Pilot
Projects in Assembly Budget Process (May 31, 2007), http://www.calegaladvocates.org/news/
article. 146248-Significant Changes -to GovernorsLegal-Representation-Pilot Projects inAss
(summarizing a reduction in state funding for California's legal representation pilot projects from
$5 million to $2.5 million).
170. See generally Debra Cassens Weiss, 2009's Toll: More Than 10,000 Law Firm Layoffs
and Lower Pay Trend, A.B.A. J., May 28, 2009.
171. Julie Kay, Deep Cuts Slam Legal Aid: State Budget Cuts, Lower Interest Rates Have

Dire Impact, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 27, 2008. IOLTA programs collect interest from client trust
accounts maintained by attorneys to deposit client money allotted for court fees, attorney retainer
fees, or settlement payments. When interest rates drop, the available money pooled from the
interest earned on these attorney accounts decreases. For a detailed description of the IOLTA
funding problem, see BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE ECONOMY AND CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES

(2009), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/the-economy-and-civillegal-services/
#IOLTA (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
172. See JOY MOSES, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PRIORITIZING FREE

LEGAL ASSISTANCE

DURING

THE GREAT

RECESSION

3-4 (2009),

http://www.american

progress.org/issues/2009/07/pdfllegal services.pdf.
173. See sources cited supra note 171. Nonetheless, there may be reasons to remain
optimistic. On October 16, 2009, California passed Assembly Bill 590, which authorizes a pilot
right to counsel program for individuals at or below 200 percent of the federal government
poverty threshold for cases involving "housing-related matters, domestic violence and civil
harassment restraining orders, probate conservatorships, guardianships of the person, elder abuse,
or actions by a parent to obtain sole legal or physical custody of a child." Cal. Assembly 590,
2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (2009). For information regarding the impact and community reaction to
the passing of Assembly Bill 590, see Carol J. Williams, California Gives the Poor a New Legal
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The legal aid community's hope that allocation of federal dollars
would significantly increase under President Barack Obama and a
Democratic Congress was recently tempered by a smaller than
expected funding allocation and no overhaul of the restrictions
imposed by the previous Republican administration. 174 Since the
general public has not expressed any concern about legal services,
and a substantial increase in funding for the current legal services
model is unlikely, legal aid advocates must expand their view of
legal services to provide assistance to the segment of the low-income
population whom pro bono and legal aid organizations are currently
unable to help.
III. THE CHALLENGES OF PRO BoNo

Despite the great need for legal services in our country, the legal
aid community remains reluctant to experiment with private attorney
models outside the pro bono context. The insistence upon pro bono
as the primary source of PAI is a barrier to providing legal services
to a larger segment of the population because it requires largely
superficial involvement by private attorneys.
The organized bar has largely been remiss in addressing the
accessibility of legal services to all Americans by only encouraging
its members to contribute a small token of money or time. "' With
the adoption of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(the "Model Code") in 1969, the legal profession began to codify the
belief that it has a duty to make legal counsel available to members
of the public. Ethical Consideration (EC) 2-1 stated that "important
functions of the legal profession are to educate laymen to recognize

Right, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/17/local/me-civil-gideon
17.
174. See, e.g., Editorial, Sins of Omission: The Forgotten Poor,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, at
A20 (advocating for increased funding for LSC). For fiscal year 2010, LSC requested that
Congress allocate $485.1 million. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., BUDGET REQUEST: FISCAL YEAR 2010
at 1 (2009), http://www.1sc.gov/pdfs/br2010.pdf. President Obama requested $435 million, the
House of Representatives approved $440 million, and the Senate approved $374.6 million. Press
Release, Legal Servs. Corp, Senate Bill Would Provide $400 Million in Funding to LSC (June 26,
2009), http://www.Isc.gov/press/pressreleasedetail_2009_.T248 RI7.php. LSC estimates that an
allocation of $440 million would result in an expenditure of $7.09 per low-income person.
MOSES, supra note 172, at 7.
175. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1969); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002).
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their problems, to facilitate the process of intelligent selection of
lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available." '
These early ethical standards explained that it was the lawyer's
role to educate laypeople about their legal problems. ' However, the
standards also warned that if a lawyer voluntarily provided legal
advice to the public and that advice was "likely to produce legal
controversy," then that lawyer should not "accept employment,
compensation, or other benefit in connection with that matter." '
The standards were concerned with client solicitation but recognized
that the profession could not "remain a viable force in fulfilling its
role in . . . society unless its members receive[d]

adequate

The rules provided that
compensation for services rendered."'
attorneys should charge reasonable fees in cases where clients were
able to pay for those services. ' The Model Code clearly stated that
"lawyers should support and participate in ethical activities" and that
"persons unable to pay all or a portion of a reasonable fee should be
able to obtain necessary legal services." "' It emphasized the need for
reasonable fees by warning that the "excessive cost of legal service
would deter laymen from utilizing the legal system in protection of
their rights." 182 Although EC 2-25 states that "[t]he basic
responsibility for providing legal services for those unable to pay
ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer," it stops short of
requiring attorneys to commit to providing free services. 1'
The 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model
Rules") continued the tradition of providing suggested contributions
to public service, but also established minimum guidelines of
"render[ing] at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per

176.

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-1.

177. Id. EC 2-2.

178. Id. EC 2-4 (setting forth the foregoing rule, but exempting former clients, relatives, and
close friends from its application).
179. Id. EC 2-16.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. EC 2-17.
183. Id. EC 2-25 ("Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional
workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged. The rendition of free legal
services to those unable to pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer, but
the efforts of individual lawyers are often not enough to meet the need. . . . Every lawyer should
support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services.").
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year." 184 In addition, they encouraged lawyers to "voluntarily
contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal
services to persons of limited means." 1' Although the 2002
amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct keep the
fifty pro bono hours and voluntary financial support as suggestions,
they also re-emphasize the earlier, broader understanding that
"[e]very lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal
services to those unable to pay." 186
Efforts to make pro bono services mandatory for all lawyers
have been vehemently opposed by the same bar members who have
gained economic benefits from promoting voluntary pro bono
efforts. ' In order to avoid mandatory pro bono, the leadership of the
private bar decided to encourage previously reluctant members to
participate in pro bono activities by marketing pro bono participation
to the largest law firms in the country as a good business decision. '
As a result of this deliberate sales pitch, the private attorney attitude
toward pro bono commitments is more motivated by career
advancement than by professional responsibility. "' The Pro Bono
Institute's publication Making the Business Case for Pro Bono 190
states:

184. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1983).
185. Id. For an overview of the evolution of Rule 6.1, see Scott L. Cummings, The Politicsof
Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1, 29-33 (2004).
186. The language quoted is the amended language added to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002).
187. See Esther F. Lardent, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the
Right Question, 49 MD. L. REv. 78, 86 (1990); see also Cummings, supra note 185, at 11-12 &
n.23 (discussing different views on mandatory pro bono). The Pro Bono Institute exists, in part, to
support and promote pro bono efforts of large law firms. Pro Bono Inst., About the Pro Bono
Institute, http://www.probonoinst.org/about.php (last visited Aug. 18, 2009). It developed the Pro
Bono Challenge to encourage law firms of fifty or more attorneys to pledge to devote either (1)
sixty or one hundred hours per attorney annually; or (2) 3 percent or 5 percent of their annual
billable hours to individuals and organizations in need. Pro Bono Inst., Law Firm Pro Bono
Challenge, http://www.probonoinst.org/challenge.php (last visited Aug. 18, 2009); see also Pro
Bono Inst., The Pro Bono Challenge, http://www.probonoinst.org/challenge.text.php (last visited
Aug. 18, 2009) (setting forth the text of the Pro Bono Challenge).
188. See, e.g., ESTHER F. LARDENT, PRO BONO INST., MAKING THE BUSINESS CASE FOR PRO
BONO 10-12 (2000), http://www.probonoinst.org/pdfs/businesscase.pdf (explaining how law firm
investment in pro bono can strengthen large firms' ability to attract and serve commercial clients).
189. See Philip R. Lochner, Jr., The No-Fee and Low-Fee Legal Practice of Private
Attorneys, in LAWYERS: A CRITICAL READER 241,243-46 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1997).
190. LARDENT, supra note 188.
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[W]ithout abandoning the moral and ethical principles at
the heart of pro bono service, [supporters] can confidently
identify those elements of pro bono practice that, when
appropriately structured and integrated into the fabric of the
firm, result in positive benefits for the law firm and its
attorneys, as well as for the clients and communities
served. "'

The benefits of institutionalizing pro bono to an individual firm
include marketing to and the recruitment of new hires, and the
retention and training of its current attorneys. 192
On account of its economic justification, pro bono is conditioned
on the willingness of attorneys and law firms to subsidize it as a
business expense. The extent of the subsidy, therefore, is dependent
upon the existence of fee-paying clients and is subject to market
forces. 193 The danger inherent in this model is that the same market
forces that reduce the ability of a law firm to subsidize pro bono
work also increase the need for pro bono services and make legal
services for the poor increasingly vulnerable. 19 It remains unclear
how the downsizing of-and in some cases disappearance of-large
law firms will influence the provision of pro bono services. " It is
not out of the realm of possibility that large-firm pro bono efforts
will diminish alongside the diminishing business that currently
subsidizes the provision of these pro bono efforts.
Today, LSC-funded legal services staff programs are
supplemented by hundreds of pro bono programs, including bar
association projects, independent nonprofit entities with staff who
191. Id. at 1; see also Cummings, supra note 185, at 107-08 ("The Pro Bono Institute has also
moved vigorously to make the 'business case' for pro bono. The notion that professionalism
constitutes a normative check on the lawyer's basest motives to act as mere profit-maximizer has
therefore given way to the view that one need not sacrifice profit for professional principlesindeed, the two go hand-in-hand.").
192. LARDENT, supra note 188, at 4-12.
193. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Lawyers' Pro Bono Service and American-Style Civil Legal

Assistance, 41 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 79, 79 (2007) (arguing that "growing reliance on pro bono
leaves . . . civil legal assistance increasingly vulnerable to market forces").
194. See id. at 87-88.
195. For example, Heller Ehrman, one of California's largest multi-national law firms and a
national pro bono leader that received multiple awards for its pro bono contributions, see Heller
Ehrman, Pro Bono Newsletter, Spring 2008, http://www.hewm.com/docs/en/ProBonoNewsletter
Spring08.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2009) (listing some of the firm's pro bono commitments),
announced its closing in September 2008, Tom Abate & Andrew S. Ross, Heller Ehrman Law
Firm to Dissolve Friday, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25, 2009, at C-1.
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refer pro bono cases to attorney panels, law school clinical programs,
and units within legal services programs. "6 The 2009 ABA Pro
Bono Report indicates that 73 percent of the attorneys interviewed
reported providing an average of 41 hours of pro bono work per year
to individuals of limited means or organizations that serve them. 1
These numbers reflect an increase from 2005 when 66 percent of
those surveyed reported that they averaged only 39 hours of pro bono

work.

198

While it is heartwarming that almost three-quarters of all
attorneys who participated in the study reported doing a week's
worth of pro bono per year, those efforts alone cannot close the gap
of access to civil legal services. Low-income clients have legal
problems that require much more time than attorneys are willing to
devote on a pro bono basis. Moreover, some of these cases are not
the type of cases to which attorneys are interested in devoting their
free time. 199 While attorneys state that they are willing to take on
unfamiliar clients from unfamiliar sources, in practice, less than 20
percent of attorneys take on cases of individuals who are neither part
of the attorney's familiar, professional, or social networks nor are
referred to the attorney by legal aid programs. 200 When one considers
196. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A
REPORT ON
THE
PRO
BONO
WORK
OF AMERICA'S
LAWYERS
6-7
(2005),

http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/report.pdf (discussing the national pro bono efforts
of law schools, legal services organizations, and law firms). For a directory of pro bono
programs, see Standing Comm. on Pro Bono and Pub. Serv. and the Ctr. for Pro Bono, ABA
Directory of Pro Bono Programs (Jan. 21, 2007), http://www.abanet.org/1egalservices/
probono/directory.html.
197. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., SUPPORTING JUSTICE II: A
REPORT ON
THE PRO
BONO
WORK OF
AMERICA'S LAWYERS
1 (2009),
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/report2.pdf. The study is based on interviews of
1,100 attorneys nationwide who were chosen as a representative sample of attorneys from all fifty
states, their distribution reflecting the national attorney population. Id. at vi. Cf DEBORAH L.
RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PROFESSION 1820, 125-53 (2005) (compiling data based on a survey of 3,000 law school graduates from Yale,
the University of Pennsylvania, Fordham, Tulane, Northwestern, and the University of Chicago;
attorneys who were recipients of the ABA's annual Pro Bono Publico Award; and firms that had
available pro bono data).
198. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., supra note 197, at 1.
199. See RHODE, supra note 197, at 134.
200. See id. at 14-16; see also ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., supra
note 196, at 13-14 (describing that, among attorneys who reported providing free legal services to
persons of limited means or to organizations serving the poor, 43 percent indicated that their
cases were referred to them by a family member or friend, "while 40 percent stated that their
cases were referred through an organized pro bono program"); DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE 154-56 (2004) (stating in part that many "attorneys also count services for friends,
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that lawyers compose less than 1 percent of the U.S. population 2 0'
and that most legal aid programs do not serve clients with incomes
above 200 percent of the poverty line, only a small segment of the
American public has access to pro bono services despite the multimillion dollar infrastructure that supports them. 202 Among those who
were surveyed for the 2009 ABA Pro Bono Report was a sample of
439 attorneys in solo practice. 203 Eighty-four percent of solo
attorneys and attorneys working in law firms of ten or fewer
attorneys reported providing pro bono services to individuals of
limited means or the organizations that help them. 204 On average,
solo and small-firm practitioners report performing 43 and 37 hours
of pro bono services per year, respectively. 205 The engagement of
solo and small-firm practitioners in pro bono work is not surprising
since small-firm practitioners have historically provided free services
for low- and moderate-income individuals. 206
Similar to their large-firm counterparts, solo practitioners use
pro bono to obtain expertise, create client loyalty, and build
reputation. 207 However, many solo and small-firm practitioners
object to the language of ABA Model Rule 6.1, which states that pro

family members, bar associations and organizations that could afford to pay for assistance");
Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice,53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 413, 425 (2003)

(noting that "[m]ost uncompensated assistance went to friends, relatives and employees of
lawyers and their clients, or to bar associations and middle- and upper-middle-class organizations
such as Jaycees, Little League, and symphonies").
201. The ABA reports that there were 1,180,386 licensed attorneys in the United States in
May

2009.

ABA

MKT.

RESEARCH

DEP'T,

LAWYER

DEMOGRAPHICS

(2008),

http://www.abanet.org/marketresearch/LawyerDemographics.pdf. The U.S. Census Bureau
estimates that 305,859,863 people were living in the country as of August 15, 2009. U.S. Census
Bureau, U.S. POPClock Projection, http://www.census.gov/population/www/popclockus.html
(last visited Aug. 15, 2009). For a discussion of the institutionalization of pro bono, see
Cummings, supra note 185, at 6-41.
202. Pro bono services are delivered at no financial cost to the client; however, there is a cost
associated with such services, which someone must pay. To effectively assess the value of pro
bono services, we need to understand exactly how much pro bono programs cost and their
effectiveness in assisting the client community.
203. ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., supra note 197, at 6.
204. Id. at 12.
205. Id. at 13.

206. See generally Lochner, supra note 189 (detailing how solo practitioners and small-firm
lawyers obtain no-fee clients).
207. See id. at 243-46 (describing the conditions under which solo practitioners provide pro
bono services).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

36

[Vol. 43:1

bono work must be provided "without fee or expectation of fee." 208
Many attorneys whose client base is largely composed of low- and
moderate-income clients believe that pro bono should include the
legal work an attorney provides to a client after the client is unable to
continue paying the attorney's bill. 209 Comment 4 to Rule 6.1 affirms
that the "intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential
for the work performed to . . . be considered pro bono."2 1 0 It further
explains that "services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an
anticipated fee is uncollected," whereas the award of statutory
attorneys' fees in cases taken on a pro bono basis do not prevent
cases from still being considered as "pro bono." 2 11 Therefore, the
work an attorney performs for a client of limited means after it has
become clear that the client will no longer pay for the services
rendered is not considered pro bono. Rule 6.1 places a premium not
on the actual work performed for clients of limited means, but on the
ability of the lawyer to finance the representation.22
Since solo practitioners must personally subsidize any free legal
work, they are more likely to count reduced-fee arrangements as pro
bono. It is not surprising that the 2009 ABA Pro Bono Report found
that "solo practitioners (36%) were significantly more likely than the
attorneys working in the largest firms (26%) to feel that a reducedfee arrangement could still qualify as pro bono service."213 Scholars
who study solo practitioners explain that solo and small-firm
208. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002) ("In fulfilling this responsibility, the
lawyer should: (a) provide a substantial majority of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or
expectation of fee to: (1) persons of limited means or (2) charitable, religious, civic, community,
governmental and educational organizations in matters that are designed primarily to address the
needs of persons of limited means. . . .").
209. See SERON, supra note 24, at 132 (quoting attorneys who had a different definition of
pro bono). "Our firm does a fair amount of pro bono work-not by choice sometimes [but]
because people don't pay us!"; "I wouldn't say I took [cases] on a pro bono basis, but they ended
up on a pro bono basis .... You have to work with the client, and there have been times where,
really, I have stopped the meter because I knew the client couldn't afford it, and so in that way I
make my contribution."). Id. See also JOEL F. HANDLER ET AL., LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT OF

LEGAL RIGHTS 104-10 (1978) (providing an overview of how members of the private bar handle
pro bono and professional work); Lochner, supra note 189, at 244 (listing various factors that
motivate attorneys to take on or to avoid pro bono services).
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. 4 (2002).
211. Id.
212. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1(b)(2) (2002) ("[T]he lawyer should . . .
provide any additional services through . . . delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced

fee to persons of limited means.").
213.

ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO AND PUB. SERV., supra note 197, at 8 n.14.
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attorneys consistently express the belief that pro bono is "an elitist
claim to good works."2 14 The pro bono discourse and infrastructure
have been principally defined by ABA leadership. In this author's
experience, Main Street lawyers-primarily solo or small-firm
practitioners--do not perceive the ABA as representing their
interests. 215
In her study of New York solo and small-firm practitioners, The
Business of Law, Carroll Seron quoted one attorney: "Nobody is
baby-sitting for me for free; the phone is not coming for free. . " 216
Seron explained that some small-firm practitioners regard ABA
mandates about pro bono to be just another mandate from elite Wall
Street attorneys who "feel they can tell all practitioners what to
do." 2 17 Many solo and small-firm practitioners object to mandatory
pro bono requirements because they cannot afford to offer free
work. 218 However, this same group of attorneys reports providing
free and reduced-fee legal services to low-income clients. 219 Both the
2009 ABA Pro Bono Report and the 1994 ABA Legal Needs Study
indicate that solo and small-firm practitioners may already play a
large role in providing legal services to the poor. The last national
survey found that, of those low-income individuals who were
assisted by an attorney, 75 percent of them used a private lawyer and
only 25 percent used a legal services attorney to handle their legal
issue. 220 The data further demonstrate that 68 percent of low-income

214. See, e.g., SERON, supra note 24, at 129; see also Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold,
Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of ProfessionalAuthority: An Introduction, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 89,

at 10 (noting that critics
215. At its midyear
percent dues reduction
members and recognize

argue professionalism is a way to protect those in privileged positions).
meeting in February 2010, the ABA House of Delegates approved a 50
for solo practitioners effective May 2010 in an effort to attract more
"the varying economic circumstances lawyers working in these fields or

situations may face." ABA to Cut Dues for Solo Lawyers and Public Service, Feb. 10, 2010,

available at http://www.jdjournal.com/2010/02/10/aba-to-cut-dues-for-solo-lawyers-and-publicservice-2/.
216. SERON, supra note 24, at 129.

217. Id.
218. See Sandefur, supra note 193, at 87-88, 93-94 (proposing that pro bono services are
offered by those who can afford it).
219. SERON, supra note 24, at 129-33 (summarizing interviews with solo and small-firm
lawyers who engage in free or reduced-fee work).
220. ALGODONES ASSOCIATES, THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 7

(1998), http://www.algodonesassociates.com/legal-services/assessing-needs/ABA%20Legal%20
Needs.pdf.
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individuals paid an attorney to resolve their legal needs. 221 When
asked about the fee arrangement with those private lawyers, 39
percent of low-income households said they paid the usual fee, and 8
percent reported a reduced-fee arrangement. 222 While the lowincome clients surveyed did not indicate the practice setting of the
attorney who collected the fee, 63 percent of private lawyers practice
in offices of five or fewer attorneys, and 48 percent of all private
lawyers are solo practitioners. 223 If low-income clients who are not
served by legal aid organizations are already paying lawyers to
handle their legal matters, then our efforts should focus on
developing an agenda that promotes affordable fees that make legal
services more accessible not only to the poor but also to the millions
of near poor who need legal services. Law firms and lawyers who
understand the market benefit of engaging in pro bono and who are
already vested in the national pro bono networks should be
encouraged to continue their investment. However, legal aid
programs should revisit their PAI budgets to develop programs that
engage the Main Street lawyers who are already providing legal
services to low- and moderate-income clients. 224
The emphasis on charitable commitments from attorneys at
primarily medium and large firms ignores the demographics of the
legal profession and limits the availability of legal services. The
ABA estimates there were 1,180,386 licensed lawyers practicing in
the United States in 2008.225 Private practice attorneys represent the
largest segment of that population, comprising 74 percent of all
lawyers. 226 A February 2006 survey by the State Bar of California,
which represents the state with the second largest population of
221. Id. at 7-8.
222. Id. at 8. Another 8 percent indicated they were not sure if they paid the reduced or nonreduced rate for the attorney's services. Id. These findings may not be a true reflection of how
many low-income individuals pay private attorneys for legal services because they may not
account for contingency fee arrangements. This question deserves further research.
223.

ABA MKT. RESEARCH DEP'T, supra note 201.

224. See Rhudy, supra note 26, at 244-45 ("[W]e can develop a stronger political base for
substantial expansions of public funding for legal services by seeking to expand services to
persons at higher income levels than are currently eligible (with a sliding fee co-payment for
some services, as with health care, counseling, and other publicly subsidized services in the
United States currently); and by committing to expand the development of judicare delivery
systems as new funding becomes available.").
225. ABA MKT. RESEARCH DEP'T, supra note 201.

226. Id.
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attorneys, 22 7 reveals that 62 percent of California attorneys in private
practice work in law firms of five or fewer attorneys. 228 If solo and
small-firm practitioners make up such a large segment of the legal
profession, we should create opportunities for them to become a part
of the institutionalized fabric that provides legal services to the poor.
In conceiving a new legal services delivery model, we must focus on
the economic needs and professional goals of the private bar, with
particular focus on those members who are already facilitating access
to the legal system for a majority of legal consumers.
IV. THE CASE FOR A "Low BoNo"
CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES AGENDA

In order to garner more support for accessible legal services,
reduced-fee arrangements by the private bar need to be considered.
To arrive at a more inclusive legal services agenda, we should
acknowledge (1) the importance of reduced-fee service
arrangements; (2) the needs and preferences of the potential client
community; (3) the goals and needs of private attorneys; and (4) the
available resources that can help shepherd a model that strengthens
and supplements legal aid.
A. "Low Bono "-ProvidingReduced-Fee Services
Charging legal fees is central to the establishment of the
attorney-client relationship for private attorneys. 229 "Low bono"
takes into account that clients should have lawyer alternatives other
than market rates and free. "Low bono" is the most popular term
used to describe discounted-rate arrangements between attorneys and
clients, particularly those clients who are underrepresented. 230 "Low
bono" arrangements consider the financial constraints of those who
seek representation and the attorneys who must charge fees to sustain
227. California reported the second highest concentration of attorneys (148,399), while New
York reported the highest concentration (150,542). ABA Mkt. Research Dep't, National Lawyer
Population by State (2009), http://www.abanet.org/marketresearchl2009_NATL.LAWfYER-by_
State.pdf.
228. THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, MEMBER SERVICES SURVEY 1, 13 tbl.1 (2006),
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/reports/2006 State-Bar-Survey.pdf.
229. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2002) (setting forth guidelines for
attorneys' fee arrangements with clients).
230. For more information on "low bono" work, see generally lowbono.org Home Page,
http://www.lowbono.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
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their own livelihood. Individuals who are unable to obtain free legal
services but who cannot pay market rates, and attorneys who depend
on paying clients for their livelihood both benefit from such
arrangements. 23 ' Although "low bono" work is not new, it has gained
more recognition in the last ten to fifteen years due in large part to
law school initiatives primarily led by the City University of New
York (CUNY) School of Law and the University of Maryland School
of Law. 232
CUNY School of Law and the University of Maryland School of
Law, along with two other schools, were funded by the Open Society
Institute in 1997 to provide training, mentoring, and support to solo
and small-firm lawyers to develop economically viable law practices
while serving low- and moderate-income communities. 233 The group
of law schools formed the Law School Consortium Project (LSCP) in
1997 to expand law schools' professionalism missions beyond
graduation to train, mentor, and provide other support to community
solo and small-firm lawyers. 234 By supporting small-firm lawyers
that provided "low bono" work, LSCP sought to increase the
availability of quality legal services to low- and moderate-income
individuals and communities.2 35 Low- and moderate-income
individuals like Timothy Cook benefitted from the "low bono"
provided by LSCP-supported attorneys. "Low bono" advocates
approach the problem of access to legal services with reduced-fee
programs that provide alternatives for the poor and the non-poor.
B. UnderstandingClient Preferences

The current legal aid program does not provide alternatives to
legal services recipients who are able to transcend poverty. To have a
231. See id.
232. Deborah Howard, The Law School Consortium Project: Law Schools Supporting
Graduates to Increase Access to Justice for Low and Moderate-Income Individuals and
Communities, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1245, 1245 n.l (2002).

233. Id. at 1245. The other two law schools were Northeastern University School of Law and
St. Mary's University School of Law. Id. at 1245 ni.
234. See Maryland Law, The Law School Consortium Project, Mission, http://
www.law.umaryland.edulprograms/clinic/initiatives/Iscp/mission.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2009).
235. As of 2009, LSCP is not active; however, a handful of law schools have continued to
support their alumni networks through Listservs, referrals, training, and incubator programs.
Interviews with Fred Rooney, Dir. CUNY School of Law Cmty. Res. Network, and Phillip
Robinson, Exec. Dir. Civil Justice, Inc., in L.A., Cal. (Oct. 16, 2009).
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legal aid program that reflects the American ideology and spirit, we
must leave behind the idea that all poor individuals are unable to
contribute to resolving their legal problems.
As a solo practitioner in Compton, California, for over seven
years, 236 the author repeatedly received calls from low-income and
near-poor individuals who preferred to pay a $75 consultation fee
than to spend a day navigating a self-help clinic or to wait two weeks
for an appointment at a legal aid organization. Poor clients who were
turned away from legal aid organizations or who could not get into a
court-based self-help center during court hours were relieved to find
an attorney who would charge them less than $200 an hour to help
them navigate a complex legal system. When solutions to procedural
issues, language barriers, and attention to the specifics of their
particular cases were not easily addressed by alternative resources
such as online forms, self-help literature, or paralegals, the legal
services consumers sought another option. Reduced-fee services and
limited-scope representation provide that option, particularly in the
areas of family, consumer, and real estate law. 237
Some examples of the clients that needed to find an alternative
fee arrangement to fit their needs include individuals like Wendy
Smith, Peter Lee, and Margarita Inzunza. Mrs. Smith, a teacher and
mother of two, left an abusive marriage but could not find an
affordable attorney to help her assert her interests in the family home
and her husband's pension. She earned just enough money to exclude
her from no-cost legal services; however, after groceries, child care,
rent, utilities, and transportation costs, her credit card balance
increased every month. Peter Lee, owner of a catering business, had
an annual gross income in 2008 of $65,000. Lee's client base shrank
approximately 60 percent in the last eighteen months as companies in
his community eliminated special events and downsized staff
lunches. His business is his only source of income, but it was no
236. For a fuller discussion of the author's law practice in Compton, California, see Luz E.
Herrera, Reflections ofa Community Lawyer, in THE MODERN AMERICAN 39 (2007), availableat
http://www.wcl.american.edu/modernamerican/documents/Herrera.pdf
237. Herbert M. Kritzer, To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer, Is That the Question?, 5 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 875, 887-89 (2008) (reviewing studies that show the nature of the clients'
problems are the dominant factor in their choice to seek legal assistance, even for low- or no-fee
clients). For more on limited-scope representation, see generally FORREST S. MOSTEN,
UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE TO DELIVERING LEGAL SERVICES A LA CARTE 28-34
(2000) (providing a sample of a limited-scope agreement) and M. SUE TALIA, A CLIENT'S GUIDE
To LIMITED LEGAL SERVICES (1997).
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longer sufficient to pay his household expenses and his spouse's
medical bills. He was recently served with two lawsuits from
creditors, and he could not find affordable legal assistance. There
were also clients like Margarita Inzunza is an undocumented
immigrant whose livelihood was based on selling homemade food in
her neighborhood, babysitting for family members, and renting the
cottage she inherited from her husband. "' She was forced to evict
her tenant, who had not paid rent in three months, because the
cottage did not comply with local government building codes. 239
While the already large poor population continues to grow, the
increasing near-poor population also struggles to navigate the legal
system. The legal services delivery system in the United States must
account not only for the poor but also for those individuals who are a
paycheck, an emergency-room stay, or a divorce away from being
part of the bottom economic quintile in this country. 240 These people
now make up the largest number of legal services consumers who
have been deemed unworthy of subsidized legal services. It is this
client community that is driving change in the landscape of attorney
services in our country. So long as the needs of these individuals
remain ignored, they will continue to define access to justice not by
the dominant attorney paradigm but by the paradigm established by
the competitors of the legal profession who have taken an interest in
their needs. The ability and willingness of low-income clients to pay
attorneys for legal services should be considered when developing
private attorney models that supplement subsidized legal services.
Models of private attorney involvement that focus on providing
238. The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that, as of March 2006, 11.5 to 12 million
unauthorized immigrants lived in the United States. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR.,
THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.:
ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, at i (2006),

http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf.
239. Municipal codes throughout the country require homeowners to obtain permits before
undertaking construction projects in their homes. Terri Cullen, Without the Right Permit,
Renovating Gets Costly, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Nov. 8, 2004, http://www.realestatejournal.com/

buildimprove/20041108-cullen.html (outlining how municipalities employ renovation codes).
Individuals who are unfamiliar with such laws and ordinances-particularly immigrants who
come from municipalities where no such codes exist-may proceed to build out the homes in
which they live, often without knowledge that they are violating the law.
240. See Warren, supra note 17, at 411 (finding that more than eight out of ten families with
children cite job loss, family breakup, and medical problems as the leading causes of bankruptcy,
and concluding that the risk of such financial collapse is now being felt strongly by a growing
proportion of middle-class families and is no longer confined to the poorest families).
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affordable legal services allow those low- and moderate-income
clients who are currently unable to obtain free services to have a
choice when free services are not an option.
The existing legal services program is a casualty of the
preferences of elite political players on both sides of the aisle who
have repeatedly failed to include the needs of the client community
in their decision making about legal services. 241 The preferences of
the legal consumer are now being reflected in the rise of the self-help
movement and the proliferation of online resources to help
consumers navigate legal problems. Unless the legal profession is
willing to consider consumer preferences in its future plans, its lobby
may not be powerful enough to combat these trends. State and ABA
legal-needs studies have contributed to our understanding of clients'
substantive legal problems; however, there is little quantitative
research to help us understand client preferences in light of
innovations such as technology, 242 court-based self-help centers,243
and non-attorney legal services providers. 244
Bar organizations, policymakers, and court administrators are in
a good position to determine what types of services are needed by
low- and moderate-income individuals in their communities. Because
of the sheer volume of their interactions with clients, courts and legal
aid organizations have the greatest opportunity to collect information
about consumer preferences for legal services. These organizations

241. Although LSC regulations require that the governing or advisory boards of legal services
providers include members of the client community, many of these boards instead include
representatives of the community organizations that represent the members of the client
community. See JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 111-12.
242. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., INCREASING LEGAL SERVICES
DELIVERY CAPACITY THROUGH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 1 (1996), https://www.oig.1sc.gov/
techlTecpaper.pdf. The Legal Services Corporation identified that
order-of-magnitude increases in delivery system capacity could be achieved by:
increasing client self-help through the new delivery medium of public access kiosks;
providing information and legal assistance via the Internet; using computer-assisted
client intake and legal assistance telephone helplines; and integrating these and other
technology applications to help reshape the delivery of legal services.
Id.
243. For example, see the online self-help center sponsored by the California Judicial Branch,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2009), or the national Self-Represented
Litigation Network, http://www.srln.org/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
244. See, e.g., Legal Zoom, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2009); Pre-Paid
Legal Services, http://www.prepaidlegal.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2009); We the People USA
Home Page, http://www.wethepeopleusa.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).
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should increase collaboration with scholars to develop a better
understanding about what clients want from a legal services model.
C. Why Attorneys Prefer "Low Bono"

It behooves us to understand reduced-fee models that may be
more appealing to a larger group of attorneys and that could serve the
needs of a larger portion of the poor and near-poor client community.
Prescribing a role for "low bono" in a more comprehensive legal
services delivery program requires that we confront the false
dichotomy between satisfying the legal needs of low- and moderateincome clients and the needs of the private bar.
By engaging the private bar in a dialogue about how it can
modify its fee structures to accommodate more affordable legal
services and still be economically viable, we will all be forced to
consider the factors that are driving the costs of legal services. A
"low bono" agenda should take into account all of the factors that
drive costs in the legal services marketplace, including education,
training and continuing education, support staff, law office
management tools, marketing, and technology. Once we understand
the basic costs of running a law office, we can begin to discuss the
amount attorneys must charge in order to maintain a reasonable
standard of living. It will also be critical to revisit earlier studies of
various legal services delivery systems to understand whether
previous models can be improved. We should encourage strategic
thinking about how to modify and improve staples of legal
practice-such as the billable hour, client collections, vendor pricing,
staff and attorney retention, ethical rules, and the cost of legal
education-which might serve as impediments to the provision of
legal services to a wider subset of our population.
The promulgation of a new legal services delivery agenda
requires that law students and lawyers, regardless of their client base,
have a better understanding of the business of law. Currently, only
certain law firm partners, solo and small-firm lawyers, and executive
directors of nonprofit legal services providers have an adequate
understanding. By embracing the existence of cost as a principal
factor in the provision of legal services, perhaps we can reexamine
our preconception that providing quality legal services means either
not charging a fee or charging a fee that is beyond the reach of most
legal consumers.
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It is this "low bono" agenda that will begin to differentiate the
profit motives of lawyers. Individuals who are comfortable
maintaining a lower standard of living in order to serve low- and
moderate-income clients and who already provide legal services to
these constituencies are the ones who can benefit most from a new
model of private attorney involvement. As long as the dominant
paradigm of legal services delivery is to provide free legal services to
the poor, the profession will never be forced to address its role in
driving the costs of legal services out of reach for the average
American. 245 A more inclusive platform of affordable legal services
is superior to one of solely free legal services because it allows us to
engage a larger group of people who care about accessibility and
sustainability.
D. Integration of "Low Bono" with Existing Models

Before constructing a new civil legal services delivery system
that can provide affordable legal services to both low- and moderateincome individuals, we must maximize the effectiveness of existing
models. A paradigm shift that increases access to justice can only
occur if individuals are willing to re-imagine the functions and
partnerships of courts, law schools, and legal aid organizations. Such
a new vision must include the collaboration of the private bar and
"low bono" models.
In response to the great need for more assistance to
unrepresented litigants, entities focused on prescribing solutions to
the unavailability of affordable legal services have formed at the
state level. 246 State supreme court judges and court personnel around
the country are key players in developing programs that facilitate
legal services delivery for self-represented litigants inside
courthouses. 247 Courts must now look at the role "low bono" can
245. Cummings, supra note 185, at 13 ("In its attempt to provide the poor with equal access
to lawyers, legal aid sought to vindicate the fairness of the legal system. In doing so, legal aid
compartmentalized the bar's public service obligation, assigning it to a cadre of full-time staff
attorneys housed in separate offices. This lifted the direct onus of service from private lawyers,
allowing them to take credit for advancing the public good, while continuing to devote
themselves to the claims of their paying clients." (citations omitted)).
246. See generally Karla M. Gray & Robert Echols, Mobilizing Judges, Lawyers, and
Communities: State Access to Justice Commissions, 47 JUDGES' J. 33 (Summer 2008) (describing

state access to justice efforts across the nation).
247. As of 2005, Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and the District of Columbia
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play in their existing programs and begin to relax archaic rules that
hinder greater access to justice. Along with a court's willingness to
collaborate with the private bar, technology will be instrumental to a
broader agenda to increase the delivery of legal services. Courts have
greatly benefited from the availability of personal computers, the
Internet, and other technological advances that increase access to
justice. Several of the most innovative and effective programs that
have emerged to address the need for more access to our legal
system-such as self-help centers, mobile legal centers, documentpreparation enterprises, limited-scope representation, and attorney
networks-integrate the use of technology. 248
However, since a significant portion of the consumer base
cannot afford legal services and does not have access to technology,
neighborhood-based self-help centers staffed by private attorneys can
increase the availability of legal services to that population and
should be one of the components of a new PAI model. Such a model
may include a mix of pro bono and fee-generating activities for

have access to justice commissions formed in whole or in part by their supreme courts. ACCESS
TO JUSTICE SUPPORT PROJECT, ACCESS TO JUSTICE PARTNERSHIPS STATE BY STATE 4-18
(2005),
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/111 3666733.35/NLADA-AccessToJustice%
239.pdf. There were fifty-four access to justice commissions and related initiatives. Id. at 19-20.
See generally ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, RESOURCE
CENTER FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE INITIATIVES, http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/
atjresourcecenter/resourcematerials.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009) (providing information on
access to justice initiatives). For more information on courts' efforts to assist self-represented
litigants, see the Self-Represented Litigation Network at http://www.srln.org/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2009).
248. For examples of such online resources, see I-Can! Legal Home Page,
http://www.icandocs.org (last visited Aug. 13, 2009); Legalmessenger.net Home Page,
http://www.legalmessenger.net (last visited Aug. 13, 2009); LegalZoom Home Page,
http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited Aug. 13, 2009); Rocket Lawyer Home Page,
http://www.rocketlawyer.com (last visited Aug. 13, 2009); Self-Help, http://www.self-help.org
(last visited Aug. 13, 2009); We the People USA Home Page, http://www.wethepeopleusa.com
(last visited Aug. 13, 2009). For an overview of how technology is impacting legal services
delivery, see Darryl R. Mountain, Disrupting Conventional Law Firm Business Models Using
Document Assembly, 15 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 170 (2007); Ronald W. Staudt, All the Wild
Possibilities: Technology That Attacks Barriersto Access to Justice, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1117
(2009); eLawyering Blog, Automated Document Assembly as a Disruptive Legal Technology,
http://www.elawyeringredux.com/2008/12/articles/change/automated-document-assembly-as-adisruptive-legal-technology (Dec. 30, 2008); and WILLIAM HORNSBY, ABA STANDING COMM.
ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, IMPROVING THE DELIVERY OF AFFORDABLE LEGAL
SERVICES THROUGH THE INTERNET: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE SHIFT TO A DIGITAL PARADIGM,
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/delivery/deltech.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
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private attorneys utilizing tools like limited-scope representation and
clinical consultation. 249
Law schools will also be important players in advancing a new
legal services model by engaging their students in practical learning
experiences and strengthening their alumni networks. While law
school clinical programs have grown considerably, most are still
peripheral to law school instruction. Law students can gain a better
understanding of the law when they see it applied. Law schools can
also help by providing professional practice programs that ease the
transition between law student and lawyer, and by connecting their
students with their alumni in order to provide further education.
Training programs and alumni networks like those at CUNY should
be replicated across the country. 250
Finally, legal aid organizations and bar associations are perhaps
in the best position to integrate private attorneys into a new model of
legal services delivery by experimenting with private attorney
collaboration beyond the pro bono models. Encouraging the
establishment of modest-means panels through lawyer referral
programs, offering training opportunities to attorneys who charge
below-market rates, and engaging the solo and small-firm bar will
help create greater accountability for neighborhood-based lawyers
and legal aid organizations. LSC restrictions on private attorneys that
exist under PAI regulations should also be removed to encourage the
development of greater legal aid collaboration with the private bar. 251
Advocates for a statutory right to counsel based on due process
grounds in cases involving basic human needs, such as shelter,
safety, health, sustenance, and parental rights, should incorporate
private attorneys in their models. 252
249. Luz E. Herrera, Community Lawyers: Training and Business Models for the
Neighborhood Lawyer (Feb. 15, 2010) (describing pilot projects integrating the "low bono"
services providers into existing structures).
250. Law schools are not limited to connecting the burgeoning population of solo and smallfirm practitioners with alumni and helping them develop practical skills; they can also contribute
to the redefinition of the meaning of public interest work.
251. The restriction barring former legal aid attorneys from receiving PAI funds within two
years of leaving legal aid employment is particularly overdue for revision. See 45 C.F.R. §
1614.1(e) (2008) ("[N]o PAI funds shall be committed for direct payment to any attorney who for
any portion of the previous two years has been a staff attorney . . . .").
252. See generally Laura K. Abel, Keeping Families Together, Saving Money, and Other
Motivations Behind New Civil Right to Counsel Laws, 42 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1087 (2009)

(arguing that legislative bodies are more likely to expand the right to counsel in civil cases as part
of a broader strategy that addresses a social problem); Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes
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These existing resources are crucial points of entry for legal
services consumers; however, the supply of affordable legal services
continues to be outweighed by demand for them by the low- and
moderate-income sectors of the market. 253 So long as the legal
profession maintains its monopoly on the provision of legal services,
a large portion of the country's civil legal needs will go unmet. 254 In
the end, more effective solutions and responses to the legal needs of
the majority will not occur unless legal aid organizations, pro bono
programs, law schools, and other institutional players are deliberate
about including solo and small-firm neighborhood lawyers in the
discussion. The author hopes this piece will help influence legal aid
advocates to rethink their perspective of what future private attorney
involvement could look like under a more comprehensive civil legal
services delivery plan. 255

Providingfor a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245 (2006) (noting
that counsel may be guaranteed by court rules and statutes in matters involving family law,
medical rights, medical involuntary commitment, and various other legal rights); Russell Engler,
Toward a Context-Based Civil Right to Counsel Through "Access to Justice" Initiatives, 40
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 196 (2006) (arguing that (1) judges, mediators, and clerks should ensure
that individual rights are not forfeited because of a lack of counsel; (2) programs should
supplement the court's role in assisting parties without counsel; and (3) if these measures do not
sufficiently protect an unrepresented party from forfeiting rights, a civil right to counsel should
attach); Michael Millemann, The State Due Process Justificationfor a Right to Counsel in Some
Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 733 (2006) (analyzing the use of state
constitution procedural due process rights as a vehicle for expanding the right to counsel in civil
cases); Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-Counsel
Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186 (2006) (documenting efforts to advocate for an
extension of the civil right to counsel, first established in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S 335
(1963), to state court matters).
253. The author does not believe that every problem has a solution in the law; however, the
author assumes that a significant portion of the nation's low- and moderate-income population
will continue to require the assistance of lawyers because of the complexity of their problems, an
imbalance of power with respect to the other parties, or an inability to navigate the legal system.
See generally Kritzer, supra note 237; Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of Equal Access
to Justice: Legal and Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy, 42 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 949 (2009)
(encouraging a greater understanding of nonlegal solutions to promote equal access to justice
because the public's first resort is to nonlegal institutions).
254. See generally Robert R. Kuehn, Undermining Justice: The Legal Profession's Role in
Restricting Access to Legal Representation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 1039 (2006) (arguing that the
structure of the legal profession limits the availability of legal services to low-income
individuals).
255. Cf Jeanne Charn, Legal Servicesfor All: Is the Profession Ready?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1021 (2009) (encouraging greater accountability and inclusiveness in a mixed-model legal
services delivery system); Charn & Zorza, supra note 25 ("We must also challenge the
longstanding assumptions about universal access [to legal aid] that have created obstacles to
innovation and reform.").
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V. CONCLUSION
Addressing the justice gap problem requires us to be critical of
existing structures, processes, and players and to be willing to
consider that perhaps our current paradigm can benefit from
agitation. The paradigm shift advocated in this Article does not
intend to discredit the importance of federal government subsidies
for legal aid to the poor, as such subsidies are critical to preserving
justice for a segment of that population. However, it does seek to
push the legal services community into a more diverse and inclusive
discussion that incorporates the moderate-income clients who need
affordable legal services and the attorneys who serve them. Both
constituencies are critical political players in a national discourse on
the delivery of legal services. A mixed-model legal services delivery
program must give these groups a stake in order to successfully
advance an agenda that also benefits the poor. The development of
such an agenda requires more quantitative data on the Main Street
lawyers, reduced-fee models, client preferences, and the factors that
drive the cost of legal services.
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